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IN SEARCH OF A THEORY
FOR CONSTITUTIONAL COMPARATIVISM
Roger P. Alford
Constitutional comparativism-the notion that international and foreign
material should be used to interpret the U.S. Constitution-is gaining currency.
Yet proponents of this practice rarely offer a firm theoretical justification for the
practice. This Article contends that constitutional comparativism should be examined
from the perspective of constitutional theory. The use of comparative and
international material must be deemed appropriate or inappropriate based on a
particular judge's interpretive mode of constitutional analysis. The Article presents
four classic constitutional theories-originalism, natural law, majoritarianism, and
pragmatism--and addresses the propriety of constitutional comparativism under
each theory. This theoretical approach goes far to explain why particular judges
embrace comparativism, while others eschew it. In so doing, it grounds the debate
in the larger framework of classic constitutional theory. It also anticipates the
disquiet that constitutional comparativists will experience at the inadequacy of any
existing constitutional theory to capture fully the comparative agenda. It therefore
introduces the broad outlines of a comparative constitutional theory and judges
such a theory based on established criteria for its saliency.
IN TRO DU C TION .................................................................................................................... 640
1. O RIG IN A LISM ............................................................................................................... 645
II. N ATURA L LAW ............................................................................................................ 659
III. M AJORITARIA N ISM ...................................................................................................... 674
A . Structural M ajoritarianism .................................................................................. 675
B. Interpretive M ajoritarianism ............................................................................... 683
C. The Synthesis of Structural and Interpretive Majoritarianism .......................... 688
IV . PRA G M A TISM ............................................................................................................... 692
V . A COM PARATIVE THEORY? ......................................................................................... 703
C on clusion ........................................................................................................................... 7 12
* Associate Professor of Law, Pepperdine University School of Law, Malibu, California.
B.A., Baylor University, 1985; M. Div., Southern Seminary, 1988; J.D., New York University, 1991;
LLM., University of Edinburgh, 1992. Grateful acknowledgement is given to Jennifer Black for her
excellent research assistance. The work was supported by a Pepperdine Summer Research Grant.
INTRODUCTION
The notion of using comparative and international law to interpret the
Constitution is gaining currency. All nine Justices have addressed the matter
in recent years,' and they remain bitterly divided on the question. A few Jus-
tices argue that comparative material "emphatically is relevant" to resolving
constitutional disputes,2 while others contend that the Supreme Court should
not consider "foreign moods, fads, or fashions" in resolving constitutional• 3
questions. At least four of the current Justices advert to comparative law in
their opinions, while three expressly criticize such references.4 The debate
crystallized with the recent decision of Lawrence v. Texas,' in which for the
first time ever a majority of the Supreme Court relied on an international tri-
bunal decision to interpret individual liberties embodied in the U.S.
Constitution.6
1. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 572-73, 576-77 (2003) (Kennedy, J.); id. at 598
(Scalia, J., dissenting); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (Stevens, J.); id. at 340-41, 347-48
(Scalia, J., dissenting); Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S. 990, 990 n.* (2002) (mem.) (Thomas, J., concurring
in denial of certiorari); Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 990 n.1 (1999) (Thomas, J., concurring in
denial of certiorari); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 921 n.ll (1997) (Scalia, J., plurality
opinion); id. at 977 (Breyer, J., dissenting); Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 710, 718 n.16
(1997) (Rehnquist, C.J.); id. at 785-87 (Souter, J., concurring). For extrajudicial speeches and
writings, see Stephen Breyer, Keynote Address, 97 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PRoc. ANN. MEETING 265
(2003) [hereinafter Breyer, Keynote Address]; Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Looking Beyond Our Borders:
The Value of a Comparative Perspective in Constitutional Adjudication, 22 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 329(2004); Sandra Day O'Connor, Keynote Address, 96 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PRoc. ANN. MEETING 348
(2002); William H. Rehnquist, Constitutional Courts-Comparative Remarks (1989), reprinted in
GERMANY AND ITS BASIC LAW: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE-A GERMAN-AMERICAN
SYMPOSIUM 411, 412 (Paul Kirchhof & Donald P. Kommers eds., 1993); Antonin Scalia, Foreign
Legal Authority in the Federal Courts, 98 AM. SOC'Y INTL L PROC. ANN. MEETING 305 (2004); Stephen
Breyer, Rflexions Relatives Au Principe de Fratemirt, Speech to the 30th Congress of the Association of
French-Speaking Constitutional Courts (June 20, 2003), at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/
publicinfo/speeches/sp06-20-03.html [hereinafter Breyer, Rflexons]; Justice Stephen Breyer &
Justice Antonin Scalia, Debate on the Relevance of Foreign Law for American Constitutional
Adjudication (Jan. 13, 2005) (transcript and recording available at http://www.wcl.american.edu/
secle/founders/2005/050113.cfm) [hereinafter Breyer Scalia Debate]; Sandra Day O'Connor, Remarks
at the Southern Center for International Studies (Oct. 28, 2003), at http://www.southemcenter.org/
OConno.transcript.pdf [hereinafter O'Connor, SCIS Remarks].
2. See Breyer, Keynote Address, supra note 1, at 282; Ruth Bader Ginsburg & Deborah Jones
Merritt, Affirmative Action: An International Human Rights Dialgue, 21 CARDOZO L REV. 253,282 (1999).
3. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 598 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Foster, 537 U.S. at 990 n.*
(Thomas, J., concurring in denial of certiorari)).
4. See Mark Tushnet, Traw onaVDniesdc Constim Law, 37 LOY. LA. LPREV. 239,245 (2003).
5. 539 U.S. 558.
6. See id. at 573 (discussing Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (set. A) (1981)).
I discuss this case at some length in Roger P. Alford, Federal Courts, International Tribunals, and the
Continuum of Deference: A Postscript on Lawrence v. Texas, 44 VA. J. INTL L 913 (2004).
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While there has been a notable increase in scholarly literature on the
subject of constitutional comparativism, there is a remarkable absence of any
serious attempt to square this methodology with classic constitutional theo-
ries. A number of justifications have been presented in support of the
practice of using comparative material, but rarely are they grounded in
constitutional theory. Often constitutional comparativists display little con-
cern for constitutional theory, and far greater concern for parochialism, lack
of U.S. leadership, and asymmetrical judicial dialogue.
The legitimacy of constitutional comparativism should be determined
by constitutional theory. Comparativism is not a constitutional theory; it is a
methodology that is employed depending on a judge's particular theory. If a
judge interprets the Constitution based on a theory of original intent, then
contemporary global practices will be of little service. If a judge espouses a
theory that the Constitution embodies natural law principles, then evidence
of universal norms may buttress that conception. If a judge grounds his or her
decisionmaking on a theory of deference to the legislature, then comparative
experiences that offer competing conceptions of "the good" will be of little
relevance. If a judge is a constitutional pragmatist, real-world consequences
at home and abroad may be deemed appropriate to cast an empirical light on
proposed solutions to common problems. Rightly understood, one's willing-
ness to engage in constitutional comparativism will depend on one's theory of
constitutional decisionmaking.
It is remarkable that this elemental point is overlooked in arguments for
constitutional comparativism. 8 Advocates of constitutional comparativism-
principally international rather than constitutional scholars-have a different
agenda. They commend constitutional comparativism not to promote a par-
ticular constitutional theory (or perhaps even result), but rather to advance a
7. See generally Bruce Ackerman, The Rise of World Constitutionalism, 83 VA. L. REV. 771
(1997); Paolo G. Carozza, "My Friend is a Stranger": The Death Penalty and the Global lus
Commune of Human Rights, 81 TEx. L. REv. 1031 (2003); William Ewald, Comparative
Jurisprudence: What Was it Like to Try a Rat? (pt. 1), 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1889 (1995); David
Fontana, Refined Comparativism in Constitutional Law, 49 UCLA L. REV. 539 (2001); Friedrich K.
Juenger, American Jurisdiction: A Story of Comparative Neglect, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 1 (1993); Anne-
Marie Slaughter, A Typology of Transjudicial Communication, 29 U. RICH. L. REV. 99 (1994); Mark
Tushnet, The Possibilities of Comparative Constitutional Law, 108 YALE L.J. 1225 (1999); Sarah H.
Cleveland, Our International Constitution (draft 2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
author).
8. Mark Tushnet has come closest to providing a theoretical defense for constitutional
comparativism. However, only one of his three explanations for comparativism (functionalism)
even borders on a defense of the practice based on a classic constitutional theory (pragmatism).
His approach appears to recognize that this new comparative approach requires new theoretical
justifications. Tushnet, supra note 7, at 1238-39.
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conception of transnational law in American courts.9 They extol the
internationalization of constitutional law as if it were an inherent good, used
to cure the American legal system of its insularity.'l
A few examples are illustrative. Harold Koh's "transnational legal proc-
ess" theory posits the internalization of international norms into domestic
law, with the judicial branch as a central channel for making international
law part of U.S. law." He justifies this approach to constitutional
interpretation in part because failure to reference such material "invites
charges of parochialism, and undermines U.S. influence over the global
development of human rights." 2 In a similar vein, Anne-Marie Slaughter
contends that a process of "constitutional cross-fertilization" is increasingly
evident, resulting in an "emerging global jurisprudence" on issues such as the
death penalty and privacy rights.'3 She asserts that although the Supreme
Court thus far has been a "lender" rather than a "borrower" court in this
"transjudicial debate,"'4 in the future it should make citation to foreign and
international decisions a common practice. In so doing, the Court will
broaden its "constitutional vision" and "fully join[ I the global community of
courts. 1 5  Bruce Ackerman has criticized the United States for its
"astonishing indifference" to the spread of world constitutionalism and
lamented the "emphatic provincialism" of the typical American judge, who
would "hardly raise an eyebrow when told.., that existing American law on
capital punishment or welfare rights offends basic constitutional principles as
the rest of the civilized world has come to understand them."'6 Paolo Carozza
argues that failure to reference comparative material to interpret our
Constitution "poses the danger of isolating the United States from full
participation in the family of nations" and that "[ilnsularity on the issue of the
death penalty... has helped to ostracize the United States from meaningful
9. As discussed at text accompanying notes 400-413, it is possible that such
commendations represent an inchoate comparative constitutional theory, although not
articulated as such.
10. See Tony Mauro, Not So At-Home Abroad: Visiting Justices Get an Earful in London,
LEGAL TIMES, July 31, 2000, at 10 (describing Justice Kennedy's encounter in London with a
"leading London barrister" who "accused the Supreme Court of 'turning its back on the Continent,"'
and reporting that this barrister noted to an unrepentant Justice Kennedy that while British courts
often invoke European and American court precedents, "[y]our system is quite certain it is has
nothing much to learn from us").
11. Harold Hongju Koh, International Law as Part of Our Law, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 43, 44 (2004).
12. Id. at 56.
13. Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Global Community of Courts, 44 HARV. INT'L L.J. 191,193 (2003).
14. Id. at 198-99, 204.
15. Id. at 204.
16. Ackerman, supra note 7, at 772-73.
and constructive engagement with much of the rest of the world.""7 Even
Justice O'Connor in a recent speech went so far as to argue that we should
use comparative material to interpret our Constitution in order to make a
"good impression."' 8  She suggested that the Supreme Court should be
cognizant of other judicial systems so as to enhance its ability to act as a rule-
of-law model for other nations.' 9
But in advocating a particular process, these and similar commentators
offer little serious discussion of classic constitutional theories to support their
comparative positions. They fall into the trap of many a comparativist, who
envisions a limited role for theory in comparative legal studies. As one
scholar noted:
The marginal role of theory... in comparative legal studies has to be
taken quite literally .... It is assumed that for comparative law proper
theoretical guidance is either not needed or not heeded ....
Comparatists often imply or suggest that there is no reason not to
compare; that in the field of comparative law almost any approach and
method may enhance a better or at least a more learned
understanding .... Whoever questions the value of comparison is
directed to its evident purpose and unquestionable necessity .... At the
margin of the discourse, comparatists admit that deficiencies in theory
and method account for the discipline's marginal role and rather blatant
defects. Within the discourse however, the obvious utility of
comparison remains aggressively asserted. 20
This marginalization of theory in constitutional comparativism is in stark
contrast to the typical emphasis found in constitutional scholarship. In the
general academic discourse on constitutional law it is theory that reigns
supreme. "For most judges, the basic unit of the Constitution is The Clause; for
most law professors, the basic unit is The Theory, the one that lurks behind the
Clauses and the cases, and puts them in their best light."'" Constitutional
theory is the meta-discourse that adumbrates most constitutional scholarship,
and particular theories have been its central obsession."
17. Carozza, supra note 7, at 1087.
18. O'Connor, SCIS Remarks, supra note 1, at 2.
19. Id.
20. Guinter Frankenberg, Critical Comparisons: Re-thinking Comparative Law, 26 HARV.
INT'L L.J. 411,416-18 (1985).
21. Bruce Ackerman, A Generation of Betrayal?, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1519, 1519 (1997).
22. See Ilya Somin, Political Ignorance and the Countermajoritarian Difficulty: A New
Perspective on the Central Obsession of Constitutional Theory, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1287, 1290 (2004);
Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part One: The Road to Judicial
Supremacy, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 333, 334 (1998).
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While the community of constitutional law scholars is obsessed with the
latest nuance of a grand constitutional theory, the community of international
law scholars is obsessed with the latest application of international norms. The
constitutional project focuses on questions such as how to choose a
constitutional theory, 3 while the international project focuses on questions
such as how to secure broader and greater international compliance.24 One
finds then a band of comparative commentators who simply assume the utility
of international and foreign material in interpreting the Constitution, without
offering a rigorous theoretical case for this particular mode of constitutional
analysis. This assumption impoverishes the constitutional discourse, as
international law scholars speak at cross-purposes with their constitutional law
counterparts, marginalizing their debate from the larger discussion on
constitutional theories.
Constitutional comparativism should turn to first principles. The
central question that should animate any discussion of constitutional
comparativism is one of constitutional theory. Why should the Court resort
to comparative material as a device to resolve whether a particular measure
violates a particular provision of the U.S. Constitution? If the central func-
tion of the Court is to resolve cases and controversies, it surely cannot be
because we wish to enhance the global rule of law, or promote international
judicial dialogue, or encourage our system to be less insular. Those concerns
might be delightful unintended consequences in an adjudicative process that
views comparativism as justified. But they cannot be why we adjudge a dis-
crete measure as falling within or afoul of a particular constitutional line.
Rather, the use of comparative material must be deemed appropriate or inap-
propriate based on whether recourse to it comports with a particular judge's
interpretive mode for resolving constitutional cases and controversies.
This Article presents four classic constitutional theories--originalism,
natural law, majoritarianism, and pragmatism-and addresses the propriety of
constitutional comparativism under each theory. This theoretical approach
goes far to explain why particular judges embrace comparativism, while others
eschew it. In so doing, it grounds the debate in the larger framework of clas-
sic constitutional theory. It also underscores the irrelevance of many current
justifications for constitutional comparativism, because none of the classic
23. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., How to Choose a Constitutional Theory, 87 CAL. L. REV. 535
(1999); Lawrence Lessig, The Puzzling Persistence of Bellbottom Theory: What a Constitutional
Theory Should Be, 85 GEO. L.J. 1837 (1997).
24. See Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599
(1997); Jenny S. Martinez, Towards an InternationalJudicio System, 56 STAN. L. REV. 429,476 (2003).
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constitutional theories reflects concern for ancillary objectives regarding the
larger role of our jurisprudence or judiciary in the global context.
Part I addresses originalism and argues that a historical comparative
approach to constitutional law is fully consistent with this theory, provided
that the correct comparative sources are utilized. This part suggests a more
rigorous historical comparativist approach for those who espouse this theory
and outlines illustrative instances in which historical comparative materials
have been used to understand original intent. Part II addresses natural law as
a constitutional theory and suggests that it continues to find application in
certain types of constitutional adjudication. In the realm of substantive due
process, the concept of "implicit ordered liberty" continues the natural law
tradition. Claims of universality offer renewed opportunities to utilize com-
parative material to buttress the argument that certain rights are implicit in
ordered liberty. Although natural law theory is discredited in constitutional
discourse, this part argues that natural law is perhaps the most coherent
rationale for recognizing the validity of comparative analysis in constitutional
adjudication. Part III presents two versions of majoritarianism: structural and
interpretive majoritarianism. The former emphasizes deference to the politi-
cal branches, while the latter focuses on a "living Constitution" reflective of
contemporary norms. A common feature of both structural and interpretive
majoritarianism is their mutual skepticism of comparative material. Under
the former, deference to the political branches belies the need for com-
parative experiences; under the latter, the contemporary values that underlie
malleable interpretations of the Constitution are based on our own national
experience. Part IV describes the pragmatic approach to constitutional law
and suggests that this approach offers perhaps the most fertile opportunity for
constitutional comparativism. Assuming that one accepts an antiformalist
theory of constitutional decisionmaking that focuses on real-world conse-
quences to constitutional adjudication, then pragmatism offers a sound theory
for constitutional comparativism. Part V anticipates the disquiet that consti-
tutional comparativists will experience at the inadequacy of existing constitu-
tional theories to capture the comparative agenda fully. It introduces the
broad outlines of a comparative constitutional theory. It then judges such a
theory based on established criteria for its saliency.
I. ORIGINALISM
Originalism is a constitutional theory that judges the propriety of consti-
tutional comparativism based on its ability to facilitate an understanding of
original intent. As such, originalism makes a sharp distinction between
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different types of comparative material. Originalism heartily welcomes
historical comparativism that fosters a contextual understanding of
linguistically indeterminate text, while flatly rejecting contemporary com-
parativism as an aberrant excrescence. The former is a legitimate exercise
in discerning the Founders' intent, the latter an inappropriate attempt to
accommodate contemporary fads and fashions.
"Originalism has been the dominant interpretative paradigm for most of
American constitutional history."25 It is a theory that is "deeply rooted in our
history and in our shared principles of political legitimacy. 26 Characteristic
of this approach is the pronouncement of a century ago: "The Constitution is
a written instrument. As such, its meaning does not alter. That which it
meant when it was adopted it means now."27 It is only in the past century
that originalism has come under sustained attack.28 Today scholars and jurists
of the originalist position are in full retreat, arguing for its application only to
curtail further advances of jurisprudence that depart from original under-
standings.29 While the appointments of Justices Scalia and Thomas to the
Court have given the theory continued vitality for the present, the political-
ization of the nomination process since the failed nomination of Robert Bork
decreases the likelihood that orginalism will gamer significant support among
future Justices of the Court.3"
In its modem variety, that is, the version adopted by members of the
Rehnquist Court, originalism is the notion that the Constitution embodies
25. Morton J. Horwitz, The Constitution of Change: Legal Fundamentality Without
Fundamentalism, 107 HARV. L. REV. 30,44 (1993).
26. Thomas C. Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L REV. 703, 705 (1975).
27. South Carolina v. United States, 199 U.S. 437, 448 (1905).
28. See Horwitz, supra note 25, at 51-52.
29. E.g., Antonin Scalia, Response, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS
AND THE LAW 129, 139 (Amy Gutmann et al. eds., 1997) (originalism is useful "not in the rolling
back of accepted old... principles but in the rejection of usurpatious new ones"); Robert H. Bork
& Daniel E. Troy, Locating the Boundaries: The Scope of Congress's Power, to Regulate Commerce, 25
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 849, 883-84 (2002). Bork and Troy state:
[Tihe reality is that the New Deal is not going to be undone, certainly not by the stroke
of a judicial pen. That does not mean, however, that courts should not approach new
problems (that is, legislation), as in Lopez and Morrison, by examining the original
understanding and using it as a touchstone in deciding the case. It may be possible for
courts to begin moving back in the direction of the original understanding, without
necessarily upending decades of case law on which expectations have settled.
Id.
30. See, e.g., STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CONFIRMATION MESS (1994); MARK
GITENSTEIN, MATTERS OF PRINCIPLE: AN INSIDER'S ACCOUNT OF AMERICA'S REJECTION OF
ROBERT BORK'S NOMINATION TO THE SUPREME COURT (1992); David A.J. Richards, Originalism
Without Foundations, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1373 (1990) (reviewing ROBERT BORK, THE TEMPTING
OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW (1990)).
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guarantees that are rooted in the Framers' moral perceptions and that protect
society against the standards of future, more brutal generations.' It rejects
arguments that the Constitution may evolve, for to make this concession is to
permit it to devolve.32 Originalism does not assume a static text incapable of
modem application. But it does assume enduring principles. Thus, originalism
does not trouble itself with wondering whether technology will render the Free
Speech Clause meaningless to modem modes of media. Originalism troubles
itself with wondering why the Court protects nonpolitical speech, or pondering
the constitutionality of capital punishment, or discovering novel
unenumerated rights.
In essence, originalism inverts Jefferson's famous maxim that "the earth
belongs in usufruct to the living."3 For an originalist, today's constitutional
rights are solely those a past generation thought we should enjoy. The great
fear of originalism is the tyranny of the future. The bulwark against this threat
is a Constitution that "retain[s] that share of prejudice in its favor which is a
salutary aid to the most rational Government."34  Future generations give
their assent to this established order, and that assent is assumed, absent
positive dissent by the populace manifesting itself in the form of amendment
or repeal."
Thus, originalism rejects the Jeffersonian notion of generational sover-
eignty. Jefferson's version of generational sovereignty espoused the notion
that each new generation should have the right to invalidate every act of
society, including the fundamental constitution of government.36 Modem
proponents of generational sovereignty invoke constitutional hermeneutics
to achieve the same result. As the Supreme Court recently put it, "times can
blind us to certain truths and later generations can see that laws once thought
necessary and proper in fact serve only to oppress. As the Constitution
31. See Scalia, supra note 29, at 145.
32. As Justice Scalia recently remarked, he detests the phrase "evolving standards of
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society" because "I'm afraid that societies don't
always mature. Sometimes they rot." Breyer Scalia Debate, supra note 1. Justice Scalia offers
examples of the devolution of rights, such as property rights, the right to bear arms, and the right
to confront one's accuser. See Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System, in A
MATTER OF INTERPRETATION, supra note 29, at 3, 42-47.
33. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Sept. 6, 1789), in 15 THE PAPERS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 392, 392 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1958) [hereinafter Sept. 6, 1789 Letter from
Jefferson] ("I set out on this ground, which I suppose to be self evident, 'that the earth belongs in
usufruct to the living': that the dead have neither powers nor rights over it. The portion occupied
by any individual ceases to be his when himself ceases to be, and reverts to the society.").
34. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Feb. 4, 1790), in 5 THE WRITINGS OF
JAMES MADISON 437 n.1 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1904).
35. Id.
36. See JOHN P. DAWSON, ORACLES OF THE LAW 93-94 (1968).
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endures, persons in every generation can invoke its principles in their own
search for greater freedom."37 Originalism flatly denies the position that the
Constitution "anticipate[s] posterity's independent appraisal of its own best
interests."38
An originalist approach makes certain questions exceedingly easy. For
example, one of the most common debates in constitutional comparativism
relates to abolition of the death penalty. Scholars and jurists who embrace
other constitutional paradigms struggle with the constitutional legitimacy of
capital punishment and cite its repugnancy in other societies as evidence that
it is cruel and unusual.39 But an originalist would resolve the matter simply.
There is firm textual support for the death penalty0 and "it is perfectly clear"
from the historical record that "the framers did not believe that the Eighth
Amendment prohibited all forms of capital punishment."' Because the
originalist methodology focuses on what the text was intended to mean, the
illegitimacy of the death penalty from the perspective of contemporary norms
is irrelevant. The death penalty was not constitutionally cruel and unusual
then, therefore it cannot be cruel and unusual today.
37. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 579 (2003); see also Sept. 6, 1789 Letter from
Jefferson, supra note 33, at 392, 395-96. Jefferson wrote:
[N]o society can make a perpetual constitution, or even a perpetual law. The earth
belongs always to the living generation. They may manage it then, and what proceeds
from it, as they please, during their usufruct. They are masters too of their own persons,
and consequently may govern them as they please. But persons and property make the
sum of the objects of government. The constitution and the laws of their predecessors
extinguished then in their natural course with those who gave them being.
Id.
38. See JOSEPH J. ELLIS, AMERICAN SPHINX: THE CHARACTER OF THOMAS JEFFERSON
113 (1997).
39. See, e.g., Carozza, supra note 7, at 1086-88 (comparing "bizarre and sterile" positivism
and historicism in U.S. legal discourse to the ideal of human dignity present in an "ius commune"
and suggesting that blindness to death penalty practices abroad blinds us to our own humanity);
Harold Hongju Koh, Paying "Decent Respect" to World Opinion on the Death Penalty, 35 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 1085, 1129 (2002) ("The evidence strongly suggests that we do not currently pay
decent respect to the opinions of humankind in our administration of the death penalty. For that
reason, the death penalty should, in time, be declared in violation of the Eighth Amendment."
(emphasis added)); William A. Schabas, International Law and Abolition of the Death Penalty, 55
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 797, 817 (1998) ("Death penalty jurisprudence provides one of the most
dramatic examples of this synergy between international and domestic human rights law.").
40. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall be held to answer for a capital.., crime, unless
on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, . . . nor shall any person... be deprived of
life.., without due process of law .... "); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("[Nlor shall any State
deprive any person of life ... without due process of law ... ").
41. GREGORY BASSHAM, ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE CONSTITUTION: A PHILOSOPHICAL
STUDY 54 (1992) (citing RAOUL BERGER, DEATH PENALTIES: THE SUPREME COURT'S OBSTACLE
COURSE 1-76 (1982)); see also WALTER BERNS, FOR CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: CRIME AND THE
MORALITY OF THE DEATH PENALTY 31 (1979).
But this is not to suggest that originalists are inherently inflexible to
change. Originalists are often caricatured as espousing static rules that are
incapable of addressing constitutional guarantees in the modem age. But
originalism (at least the more plausible variety) recognizes that constitutional
guarantees may embrace abstract principles that will admit application to
new circumstances. Thus, Justice Scalia recognizes that the Eighth
Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment is "no mere
concrete and dated rule," but rather an abstract principle that can be applied
to all sorts of tortures unknown at the time the Eighth Amendment was
drafted.42 But "[wihat it abstracts," he would contend, "is not a moral princi-
ple of 'cruelty' that philosophers can play with in the future, but rather the
[then] existing society's assessment of what is cruel." 3 The Eighth Amendment
means not "whatever may be considered cruel from one generation to the
next, but what [the Framers] consider[ed] cruel... ; otherwise, it would be no
protection against the moral perceptions of a future, more brutal, generation. It
is, in other words, rooted in the moral perceptions of th[at] time.4 Thus, Justice
Scalia's originalism expresses an abiding concern about a constitutional
standard embracing evolving standards, recognizing that the Framers anticipated
that society may devolve toward a brutality that the guarantees sought to
protect against.
Originalists warmly embrace constitutional comparativism, provided it
elucidates a better understanding of original intent.45 Thus, originalism embraces
the use of historical comparative material, but rejects the use of contemporary
material. Contemporary comparativism is suspect because it constitutes a subset
of a much larger body of material that originalists reject in their conception of
constitutionalism. For an originalist, Supreme Court jurisprudence that embraces
contemporary comparativism reflects an "insidious appeal [to] internationalism" 6
that interferes with the proper interpretive task of identifying original
understandings. As Robert Bork put it, the interpretive question that should be
asked is "not the current views of foreign nations" but "the understanding of
the ratifiers of the Bill of Rights in 1791.""4
42. Scalia, supra note 29, at 145.
43. Id.
44. Id. (emphasis in original).
45. See infra notes 50-77 and accompanying text. As Justice Scalia succinctly put it, "my
theory of what I do when I interpret the American Constitution is I try to understand what it meant,
what was understood by the society to mean when it was adopted .... Now, obviously if you have
that philosophy ... foreign law is irrelevant with one exception: Old English law." Breyer Scalia
Debate, supra note 1.
46. ROBERT BORK, COERCING VIRTUE: THE WORLDWIDE RULE OF JUDoES 22 (2003).
47. Id. at 23.
Constitutional Comparativism 649
52 UCLA LAW REVIEW 639 (2005)
But originalists are more than willing to reference comparative material
if it will advance an understanding of original meaning. Originalism recog-
nizes that the Supreme Court necessarily examines the historical context at
the time of the founding to understand constitutional text. If constitutional
text can only be understood contextually, then recourse to historical com-
parative material is essential in the interpretative process. As James Madison
recognized in The Federalist No. 37, all laws are obscure and equivocal and
their meaning can only be ascertained by understanding the medium through
which their conceptions are conveyed:
The use of words is to express ideas. Perspicuity, therefore, requires not
only that the ideas should be distinctly formed, but that they should be
expressed by words distinctly and exclusively appropriate to them. But
no language is so copious as to supply words and phrases for every
complex idea, or so correct as not to include many equivocally
denoting different ideas. Hence it must happen that however accu-
rately objects may be discriminated in themselves, and however
accurately the discrimination may be considered, the definition of
them may be rendered inaccurate by the inaccuracy of the terms in
which it is delivered.48
Thus, even under an originalist conception, linguistic indeterminacy
requires reference to the meaning of terms as they were understood at the
time of the founding.49 That task of understanding original meaning fre-
quently requires reference to historical comparative material.
So frequent is this comparativist practice in originalist understandings of
the Constitution that it barely needs citation."0 Because the Constitution
does not specify how it is to be construed, for an originalist the principal
determinant of meaning is historical context.' Particularly common for
originalists is "genealogical comparativism, ' 2 which examines the historical
practices and legal heritage of England.
48. THE FEDERALIST No. 37 (James Madison); see also Horwitz, supra note 25, at 49-51
(discussing Madison and early American originalism).
49. Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 864-65 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (discussing original
meaning of the Confrontation Clause); Horwitz, supra note 25, at 49-50; Scalia, supra note 32, at 37.
50. For example, Justice Scalia has cited Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of England
in over seventy-five cases.
51. See Scalia, supra note 29, at 135.
52. Fontana, supra note 7, at 572. For a useful recent example of comparative analysis used
to understand the original meaning of indeterminant text, see Seth Barrett Tillman, A Textualist
Defense of Article I, Section 7, Clause 3: Why Hollingsworth v. Virginia was Rightly Decided, and
Why INS v. Chadha was Wrongly Reasoned, 83 TEXAS L. REV. (forthcoming April 2005)
(discussing comparative analysis to discern originalist understandings of the Orders, Resolutions,
and Votes Clause).
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For example, in Kilbourn v. Thompson,53 the Court addressed the English
origins of the constitutional authority of Congress to hold a witness in con-
tempt. The Court detailed at some length the historic adjudicatory function
of the House of Parliament and then noted that this history is meaningless for
the American context: "[T]he powers and privileges of the House of
Commons of England, on the subject of punishment for contempts, rest on
principles which have no application to other legislative bodies, and certainly
can have none to the House of Representatives of the United States."54
Thus, genealogical comparativism was used to show the radical departure of
our system of government from its ancestors, and the rights of those held in
legislative contempt in light of this departure from our English roots.55
In another death penalty case, Justice Scalia and Chief Justice
Rehnquist argued that the Eighth Amendment cannot be understood with-
out reference to its "antecedent": the English Declaration of Rights of 1689.56
Because early Americans claimed all the rights of English subjects, the
Framers' use of the language of the English Bill of Rights is convincing proof
that they intended to provide at least the same protection. Thus, "not only is
the original meaning of the 1689 Declaration of Rights relevant, but also the
circumstances of its enactment, insofar as they display the particular 'rights of
English subjects' it was designed to vindicate."" While "direct transplant of the
English meaning to the soil of American constitutionalism" is unrealistic,
Justice Scalia and Chief Justice Rehnquist recognize that its meaning sheds
53. 103 U.S. 168 (1880). In another case involving the House Un-American Activities
Committee, the Court noted the English roots of the privilege against self-incrimination and
discussed the early nineteenth-century practices in English-speaking jurisdictions to illuminate the
requirements for holding witnesses in contempt in legislative proceedings. Quinn v. United States,
349 U.S. 155, 161-62, 167 n.36 (1955).
54. Kilboum, 103 U.S. at 189.
55. In a similar vein, in interpreting the Due Process Clauses, the Court in Hurtado v.
California distinguished our Constitution from the Magna Carta, noting that as the "broad and
general maxims of liberty and justice held in our system a different place and performed a different
function from their position and office in English constitutional history and law, they would receive
and justify a corresponding and more comprehensive interpretation." Hurtado v. California, 110
U.S. 516, 532 (1884); see also Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 582 (1961) (discussing
accusatorial and inquisitorial systems of interrogation in common law and civil law traditions as
historical context for the Fourteenth Amendment). In other instances, the Court has examined our
English roots and found them inconclusive in facilitating an original understanding of our
constitution. See Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 272-73
(1989) ("It is difficult to understand how [the] Magna Carta, or the English Bill of Rights as viewed
through the lens of [the] Magna Carta, compels us to read our Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines
Clause as applying to punitive damages when those documents themselves were never so applied.").
56. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957,966 (1991).
57. Id. at 967.
light on what "cruel and unusual punishments" meant to the Americans who
adopted the Eighth Amendment. 8
More recently, in Atkins v. Virginia,9 Justice Scalia ridiculed the Court for
relying on the practices of the "world community" in assessing whether
executing the mentally retarded violates the Eighth Amendment." Yet he
simultaneously referred to the eighteenth-century practices of England to
establish that only the severely or profoundly retarded enjoyed special status
under the law at that time.' In a similar vein, Justice Thomas has excoriated
Justice Breyer for relying on contemporary European norms to define prolonged
death row delays as cruel and unusual, while intimating that the eighteenth-
century English practice of a forty-eight hour delay between sentencing and
execution might be constitutionally permissible were it to occur today. 2
But an originalist approach does not simply utilize historical
comparative material to understand constitutional text. It also recognizes
that reference to the historical matrix is necessary to comprehend original
understandings of constitutional structure. In a military death penalty case,
Loving v. United States," the Court heavily relied upon the English experience
to interpret the constitutional provision vesting power in Congress to "make
Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces. ' 64
The Court noted that it has interpreted that provision by drawing upon
English constitutional history regarding parliamentary control of military tri-
bunals. The Court concluded that the Framers learned from this English
experience "the necessity of balancing efficient military discipline, popular
control of a standing army, and the rights of soldiers" as well as the "risks
inherent in assigning the task to one part of the Government to the exclu-
sion of another."6 Thus, separation of powers principles in military justice
were derived, in part, from our genealogical roots. From this experience, the
early Republic recognized that civil court jurisdiction over military death
penalty cases should be the rule if the offense was an ordinary capital crime.6
58. Id. at 975.
59. 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
60. Id.
61. Id. at 340-41,347-48 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
62. Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S. 990, 990 n.* (2002) (mem.) (Thomas, J., concurring in denial of
certiorari); Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 990 n.1 (1999) (Thomas, J., concurring in denial of certiorari).
63. 517 U.S. 748 (1996).
64. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 14.
65. Loving, 517 U.S. at 761.
66. Id. at 752. Significantly, Justice Scalia took issue with the comparative approach of the Court:
[Iln drafting the Constitution, the Framers were not seeking to replicate in America the
government of England; indeed, they set their plan of government out in writing in part to
make clear the ways in which it was different from the one it replaced. The Court... treat[s]
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Likewise, in United States v. Johnson,67 the Court interpreted the Speech
or Debate Clause in light of the English Bill of Rights of 1689, which devel-
oped out of the struggle for power between the House of Commons and the
British monarchy and the attempts by the latter to intimidate the former by
using criminal and civil law to suppress and intimidate critical legislators:
Since the Glorious Revolution in Britain, and throughout the United
States history, the privilege has been recognized as an important
protection of the independence and integrity of the legislature. In the
American governmental structure the clause serves the additional
function of reinforcing the separation of powers so deliberately estab-
lished by the Founders.6
In addition to English experiences, it is well recognized that the Framers
61
were transfixed with the comparative experience in continental Europe, par-
ticularly the confederate systems in Switzerland, Germany, and the
Netherlands." They examined with great care "the events that have attended
confederate governments" in Europe to establish the illegitimacy of a confed-
eracy and the superiority of federalism." The Federalist Nos. 19 and 20 are
devoted exclusively to an examination of the confederate systems in Europe.1
2
Recent Rehnquist Court pronouncements on federalism regularly reference the
Framers' consideration of these competing systems of government."
Justice Scalia's denunciation in Printz v. United States" of Justice Breyer's
comparativism articulates the distinction between historical and contemporary
structural comparativism. When Justice Scalia, speaking for the Court, said
that "comparative analysis [is] inappropriate to the task of interpreting a
the form of English government as relevant to determining the limitations upon Clause 14's
grant of power to Congress. I would leave this historical discussion aside. While it is true, as
the Court demonstrates, that the scheme of assigned responsibility here conforms to English
practices, that is so not because Clause 14 requires such conformity, but simply because what
seemed like a good arrangement to Parliament has seemed like a good arrangement to
Congress as well.
Id. at 776 (Scalia, J., concurring). In this instance, Justice Scalia found the historical context
unnecessary because the text is sufficiently clear.
67. 383 U.S. 169 (1966).
68. Id. at 178.
69. See THE FEDERALIST Nos. 6, 11, 12, 21, 22, 29, 75,80 (Alexander Hamilton), NOS. 14,37,
42, 43, 54 (James Madison), NOS. 19, 20 (James Madison and Alexander Hamilton).
70. See THE FEDERALIST NOS. 19, 20.
71. THE FEDERALIST NO. 17 (Alexander Hamilton).
72. THE FEDERALIST Nos. 19,20.
73. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 180 (1992) (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 20);
see also Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 714 (1999) (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 20); Printz v. United
States, 521 U.S. 898, 921 n.11 (1997) (quoting THE FEDERALISTNO. 20).
74. 521 U.S. 898.
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constitution, though it was of course quite relevant to the task of writing
one,"" he was not arguing against structural comparativism per se. He was
arguing against contemporary comparisons to understand historical structures.
The Court in Printz noted that James Madison and Alexander Hamilton
examined at great length the Dutch experience in support of a federal
conception of government, while Patrick Henry examined the Swiss
confederacy in support of an anti-federalist structure. From these compari-
sons the Framers derived our own form of federalism as "the unique contribu-
tion of the Framers to political science and political theory."76 Thus, even
while denouncing comparativism the Court conceded that an appreciation of
the Framers' understanding of the merits and demerits of then-existing sys-
tems informs our understanding of our own federal system.
These and similar cases suggest that an originalist will draw a sharp dis-
tinction between contemporary comparativism that embraces international
laws and practices and historical comparativism that seeks to understand the
context from which the Constitution was born. The former is viewed as fad-
dish and fashionable,77 the latter a proper indicator of the founders' intent.
The originalist position on constitutional comparativism has been the
source of significant criticism. Putting aside the general critiques of originalism
that are well-worn, one may identify at least two specific criticisms of the
originalist position on comparativism.
One common critique is that originalists are inconsistent in their insis-
tence upon the irrelevance of contemporary foreign and international law.78
This is without foundation. It is true that jurists of the originalist persuasion
have occasionally referenced contemporary foreign and international prac-
tices. For example, proponents of comparativism have made much of Chief
Justice Rehnquist's extrajudicial speech in which he stated that "it is time
that the United States courts begin looking to the decisions of other consti-
tutional courts to aid in their own deliberative process."7 9 But the proponents
75. Id. at 921 n.11.
76. Id. (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 575 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
77. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 598 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Foster v.
Florida, 537 U.S. 990, 990 n.* (2002) (mem.) (Thomas, J., concurring in denial of certiorari).
78. See Koh, supra note 11, at 47.
79. Rehnquist, supra note 1; see, e.g., Ginsburg, supra note 1, at 330; Koh, supra note 11, at
48; Harold Hongju Koh, On American Exceptionalism, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1479, 1514 & n.113
(2003). It is worth noting that the full text of Justice Rehnquist's speech gives no indication that
he believed that comparative law was appropriate in resolving individual rights. See Rehnquist,
supra note 1, at 412. He stated:
[Now that constitutional law is solidly grounded in so many countries, it is time that the
United States courts begin looking to the decisions of other constitutional courts to aid
in their own deliberative process. The United States courts, and legal scholarship in our
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often ignore the numerous instances-including one case rendered just four
months before this speech-in which Justice Rehnquist rejected the use of
contemporary comparative material in constitutional adjudication."0 As for
his judicial opinions, when Justice Rehnquist cites contemporary foreign
practices (with one exception8 1), he either fails to indicate their relevance,82
or expressly suggests their irrelevance."
Likewise, Justice Scalia has consistently opposed references to contem-
porary comparative material in constitutional adjudication. The two instances
cited to the contrary are either inapposite or support another theory of
constitutionalism for which he is well known.84 Moreover, his occasional ref-
erence to comparative material in other contexts supports rather than
undermines his methodology. Whether interpreting a constitution, treaty or
statute, Justice Scalia seeks to understand original meaning. Accordingly, in
interpreting a modem treaty, Justice Scalia will not hesitate to examine
contemporary judicial decisions in Britain and Australia because, in his view,
"[f]oreign constructions are evidence of the original shared understanding of
the contracting parties."85 If one focuses on discernment of original meaning,
Justice Scalia's antipathy for contemporary comparativism in one context and
affinity for it in another is perfectly logical.
country generally, have been somewhat laggard in relying on comparative law and
decisions of other countries. But I predict that with so many thriving constitutional
courts in the world today... that approach will be changed in the near future.
Id.
80. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 572-73 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304,
324-25 (2002) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 369 n.1 (1989).
But see Koh, supra note 11, at 52 n.62 (acknowledging a distinction between Chief Justice
Rehnquist's extrajudicial and judicial pronouncements).
81. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 710, 718 n.16 (1989). Glucksberg is
discussed in this Article in the natural rights paradigm and the pragmatism paradigm. See infra
notes 164-170, 378-390 and accompanying text.
82. E.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 945 n.1 (1992) (Rehnquist, C.J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing abortion decisions in West Germany and Canada).
83. E.g., Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 828 (1997) ("There would be nothing irrational
about a system that granted standing in these cases; some European constitutional courts operate
under one or another variant of such a regime. But it is obviously not the regime that has
obtained under our Constitution to date." (citations omitted)).
84. Harold Koh suggested that Justice Scalia "has been far from consistent in insisting upon
the irrelevance of foreign and international law. Depending on the factual setting, he has not
hesitated to take foreign practice into account or to argue in favor of construing U.S. law consistently
with principles of international law." Koh, supra note 11, at 47 (citing McIntyre v. Ohio Election
Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 381 (1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting) and Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California,
509 U.S. 764, 820 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting)). The reference in McIntyre reflects a majoritarian
paradigm in which Justice Scalia argues for deferral to legislative prerogatives, and Hartford Fire is not
a constitutional case and is wholly irrelevant to the question of constitutional comparativism.
85. Olympic Airways v. Husain, 124 S. Ct. 1221, 1232 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
A more convincing critique of originalism is its selectivity in considering
the historical record. As one commentator put it, "the historical record is so
inconclusive, so full of gaps and ambiguities, that originalist judges... must
continuously make difficult and controversial historical and normative
judgments."86  This is no less true with respect to historical comparativism.
Originalist understandings of historical comparativism as constitutional
context raise the critical question of which context to choose in determining
original meaning.
To take one example, it is curious to say the least that in interpreting the
Bill of Rights, an originalist does not take into greater account the influence of
the French Declaration of the Rights of Man. That Declaration-drafted in
1788 and 1789 and published on August, 27, 1789 (just one month before
Congress formally proposed the Bill of Rights on September 25, 1789)-
provides a useful prism to understand our own Bill of Rights. While Madison
was drafting the Bill of Rights, the French Revolution was in full swing and was
greeted in America with great enthusiasm. John Adams expressed the view
that "most of the events in the annals of the world are but childish tales
compared to it.8 7 He hoped the French Revolution would "produce effects in
favor of liberty, equity, and humanity as extensive as this whole globe and as
lasting as all time."8 Thomas Jefferson corresponded with Madison in January
1789 informing him that in France "[e]verybody here is trying their hands at
forming declarations of rights." 9 Moreover, it is well known that Jefferson read
and critiqued Lafayette's June 1789 drafts of the Declaration of the Rights of
Man and offered his own version.'c Jefferson also critiqued the Bill of Rights in
light of his experience in France, suggesting that its language mirror provisions
of the Declaration."
86. BASSHAM, supra note 41, at 55.
87. DAVID McOCULLOUGH, JOHN ADAMS 417 (2001).
88. Id.
89. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Jan. 12, 1789), in 14 THE PAPERS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 33, at 436, 437, cited in Mark W. Janis, The Declaration of Indepndence,
the Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen, and the Bill of Rights, 14 HUM. RTS. Q. 478, 480 (1992).
90. See ELLIS, supra note 38, at 109; Janis, supra note 89, at 480; Letter from Thomas Jefferson to
Lafayette (June 3, 1789), in 15 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 33, at 165. See generally
lain McLean, Thomas Jefferson, John Adams, and the Dclaration des Droits de l'Homme et du
Citoyen (unpublished manuscript, Nov. 1, 2004), available at http://www.nuff.ox.ac.uk/Politics/papers/
2002/w24/ddhc3.pdf.
91. One day after the publication of the Declaration, Jefferson wrote to Madison proposing
modifications to the Bill of Rights that are similar to Article 11 of the Declaration of the Rights of Man.
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Aug. 28, 1789), in 15 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON, supra note 33, at 364, 367. Jefferson wrote:
Their declaration of rights is finished. If printed in time I will inclose a copy with
this.... I must now say a word on the declaration of rights you have been so good as to
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One might think the perceived deficiencies of the Bill of Rights and
Jefferson's proposals for improvement based on language from the French
experience might inform our understanding of the original meaning of the
Bill of Rights. One would also think that if Justice Scalia believes context is
important because it reveals "the moral perceptions of the time"92 then the
historic developments in France would greatly impact those perceptions. Yet
the Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen has never been referenced
in a judicial opinion by an originalist member of the Court (or any other
member, for that matter).93 Justice Scalia is positively dismissive of the
French Declaration, describing it merely as an aspirational document of phi-
losophy that is of little use in understanding our own constitutional guaran-
tees.94 "There is no such philosophizing in our Constitution, which unlike
the Declaration of Independence and the Declaration of the Rights of Man, is a
practical and pragmatic charter of government."" But this fact in itself is of
constitutional relevance. The French Declaration embodies the historical
debate common in the late eighteenth century over whether a bill of rights
should contain metaphysical principles of natural and civil liberty or enunciate
a plain and positive declaration of the rights themselves.96 At a minimum, the
send me. I like it, as far as it goes; but I should have been for going further. For instance
the following alterations and additions would have pleased me. Art. 4. "The people shall
not be deprived of their right to speak to write or otherwise to publish anything but false
facts affecting injuriously the life, liberty, property or reputation of others or affecting the
peace of the confederacy with foreign nations."
Id. Compare DECLARATION OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN AND OF THE CITIZEN art. 11 (1789)
("[Elvery citizen may speak, write, and print freely, subject to responsibility for the abuse of such
liberty in the cases determined by law."), with James Madison, Speech to the House of
Representatives Presenting the Proposed Bill of Rights (June 8, 1789), reprinted in JACK RAKOVE,
DECLARING RIGHTS 168, 173 (1998) ("The people shall not be deprived or abridged of their right
to speak, to write, or to publish their sentiments.").
92. Scalia, supra note 29, at 145.
93. Although, it should be noted that at least one state supreme court has had occasion to
interpret its state constitution in light of the French experience. See Madison & Indianapolis R.R.
Co. v. Whiteneck, 8 Ind. 217, 223-25 (1856).
94. Scalia, supra note 29, at 134.
95. Id.
96. See THOMAS PAINE ON A BILL OF RIGHTS, 1777, reprinted in 1 BERNARD SCHWARTZ,
THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 314,315 (1971). Paine wrote:
I conceive a Bill of Rights should be a plain positive declaration of the rights themselves:
and, instead of saying it should "contain the great principles of natural and civil liberty,"
that it should retain such natural rights as are either consistent with, or absolutely necessary
toward our happiness in a state of civil government; for were all the great natural
rights... to be admitted, it would be impossible that any government could be formed
thereon, and instead of being a Bill of Rights fitted to a state of civil government, it would
be a Bill of Rights fitted to man in a state of nature without any government at all.
Id. As Jed Rubenfeld has noted, while the Declaration of the Rights of Man "spoke in the
language of universal rights," the "American language of constitutional rights ... does not claim
Declaration's metaphysical pronouncements---like general principles in
Madison's earlier version of the Bill of Rights--could have been viewed as a
cautionary warning to the ratifiers against pronouncements upon which it would
be impossible for a government to be formed.97 Originalists could thus use the
French Declaration as evidence of the nonaspirational nature of our own Bill of
Rights.98 Moreover, if "context is everything,"99 Justice Scalia never explains
why the English Declaration of Rights of 1689 is somehow more indicative of
the perceptions of the times than the French Declaration drafted in 1789 with
Jefferson's help and Madison's knowledge.'" As Jefferson noted, in the French
Revolution we can see our own visage, for the French revolutionaries viewed
the American proceedings "as a model for them on every occasion," with the
American experience "treated like that of the bible, open to explanation but
not to question." 10'
In sum, originalists are firmly committed to historical comparativism in
constitutional adjudication. Justice Scalia recently joked that he uses com-
parative material more than any other Justice; it just happens to be old
material. 2 Under this originalist conception, the meaning to be given
ambiguous text can only be ascertained by an examination of historical
context. That context includes not simply the American experience, but also
the moral perceptions of other countries that influenced the standards of the
times. But because current practices are irrelevant to understanding original
meaning, originalists do not take cognizance of evolving standards or current
developments, foreign or domestic.
the authority of universal law. It claims ... the authority of democracy." Jed Rubenfeld,
The Two World Orders, WILSON Q., Autumn 2003, at 22, 29.
97. See PAINE, supra note 96, at 314 (commenting that a comparison of the Bill of Rights
and the French Declaration reveals Thomas Paine's essential point that a bill of rights should be a
plain positive declaration of rights rather than a statement of great principles of natural liberty);
BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE GREAT RIGHTS OF MANKIND: A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN BILL
OF RIGHTS 200 (1992) ("Madison had also included some general principles in his proposed
amendments, but they were eliminated during the congressional debates.").
98. This is how Justice Scalia uses it in his extrajudicial writing. See, e.g., Scalia, supra
note 29, at 134.
99. Scalia, supra note 32, at 37.
100. Indeed, Jefferson believed that French perceptions of liberty were more valuable than
English perceptions, as the French "give a full scope to reason" and "strike out truths as yet unperceived
and unacknowledged" by the English, while "[an Englishman, dozing under a kind of half reformation,
is not excited to think by such gross absurdities as stare a Frenchman in the face wherever he looks,
whether it be towards the throne or the altar." Letter from Thomas Jefferson to David Humphreys
(Mar. 18,1789), in 14 THE PAPERS OF THOMASJEFFERSON, supra note 33, at 676-77.
101. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, supra note 91, at 366.
102. Scalia, supra note 1, at 306; Breyer Scalia Debate, supra note 1 (Justice Scalia remarking
that "the reality is I use foreign law more than anybody on the Court. But it's all old English law.").
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II. NATURAL LAW
Natural law is perhaps the most coherent rationale for recognizing the
validity of comparative analysis in constitutional adjudication. Although
rarely framed in terms of natural law, appeals to universalism and fundamen-
tality are often grounded in this theory. To contend that a right is
inalienable or naturally endowed invites reference to comparative
experiences to buttress or betray the universal appeal of the asserted right.
The substantive due process doctrine of "implicit ordered liberty" is the
modem vehicle that has been employed to incorporate comparative
experiences in furtherance of natural law constitutionalism.
"Natural law" generally refers to a "higher" law accessible to human rea-
son and not dependent on (though compatible with) divine revelation.' 03 As
Edward Corwin put it, natural law is predicated on the notion that
there are certain principles of right and justice which are entitled to prevail
of their own intrinsic excellence, altogether regardless of the attitude of
those who wield the physical resources of the community.... They are
external to all Will as such and interpenetrate all Reason as such. They
are eternal and immutable. In relation to such principles, human laws
are... merely a record or transcript, and their enactment an act not of will
or power but one of discovery and declaration."'4
Advocates of constitutional comparativism occasionally appeal to
universal norms in language that echoes natural law principles. 5 The
universality of our common experience, it is suggested, justifies
103. Robert P. George, Natural Law, The Constitution, and the Theory and Practice of Judicial
Review, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 2269, 2269 (2001).
104. Edward S. Corwin, The "Higher Law" Background of American Constitutional Law, 42
HARv. L. REV. 149,152 (1928).
105. See, e.g., Carozza, supra note 7, at 1080. Carozza states:
[T]he normative force of... transnational jurisprudence ... is premised upon the recognition
of the common humanity of all persons. The universality of this sentiment... consistently
provides a justification for courts to take foreign sources into account despite constraints of
constitutional form, historical context, or political and social practice. The courts treat the
idea of human dignity as the common thread to be followed across all those contingencies. In
doing so, they never suggest that a dignified, human life means anything fundamentally
different in the otherwise variable contexts of different cases.
Id.; see also Breyer, Rflexions, supra note 1. Breyer states:
On trouve partout dans le monde le d~sir des peuples de construire des gouvernements
d~mocratiques dot6s de garanties en mati re de liberts fondamentales; on trouve partout le
d~sir d'6tablir un 6tat de droit dont l'efficacit6 serait renforc~e par un pouvoir judiciaire
ind6pendant,-le tout 6tant n~cessaire la prosp~rit6 konomique et A la dignit6
humaine.... En un mot on trouve partout des juges faisant face aux memes esp~ces de
problmes et armts des memes espices d'instruments juridiques.
transnational borrowing of laws and practices that invoke higher laws or
embrace meta-ethical abstractions. A similar approach was invoked in the
early days of our national experience. Because the natural law tradition is
generally discredited as a constitutional theory, it is worth highlighting its
historical pedigree and outlining its current vitality.
As is well known, the early Court regularly relied on natural law con-
cepts to restrict government action. What is particularly noteworthy about
the Court's early natural law decisions is their indifference to reliance upon
the written constitution or unwritten natural law as the fundamental law that
justified review of legislative enactments.' 6 With the exception of claims
involving separation of powers, the Court "referred almost indiscriminately to
the constitution... natural law, ancient custom, and inalienable
rights .... Thus the written constitution... served as the sole source of fun-
damental law for determining the government's internal structure, but not for
describing its relationship with the citizenry."' 7 In relying on natural law, the
Court frequently resorted to comparative experiences.
An early example of natural law constitutionalism is found in Ware v.
Hylton, 1°" in which the Jay Treaty was held to void a Virginia state law that
confiscated British creditor's property. 9 Hylton is noteworthy because it is the
first time that the Supreme Court determined that federal courts could review
and invalidate state law."0 But it is also noteworthy for the bases upon which the
laws were interpreted and invalidated. Justice Paterson argued for an expansive
reading of the Treaty, finding that it was incompatible with "principles of justice
and policy that contracts entered into by individuals of different nations should
be violated by their respective governments in consequence of national quarrels
and hostilities.'"" Rather than rely on constitutional guarantees," 2 he appealed
to the dictates of "moral sense," "right reason," and "natural equity" to argue
106. See Suzanna Sherry, The Founders' Unwritten Constitution, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1127, 1135-
36 (1987); see also Philip A. Hamburger, Natural Rights, Natural Law, and American Constitutions, 102
YALE L.J. 907, 907-08 (1997) (citing other scholars who have argued this principle).
107. Sherry, supra note 106, at 1135.
108. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199 (1796).
109. There are numerous other examples that could be cited. In the most celebrated natural
law case of the period, Calder v. Bull, the Court generously relied upon comparative
understandings and experiences in articulating the basis for prohibiting ex post facto laws and
defining the constitutional prohibition against such laws. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386,
389-93 (1798) (Chase, J.).
110. See DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE FIRST
HUNDRED YEARS 1789-1888, at 39 (1985).
111. Hylton, 3 U.S. at 255 (Paterson, J.).
112. Justice Chase, by contrast, relied on the Supremacy Clause. See id. (Chase, J.) ("A treaty
cannot be the Supreme law of the land... if any act of a State Legislature can stand in its way.... [L]aws of
any of the States, contrary to a treaty, shall be disregarded."); CURRIE, supra note 110, at 39-40.
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Virginia could not by statute confiscate British property.' Part of the appeal
to natural justice included references to international practice. "Confiscation
of debts is considered a disreputable thing among civilized nations" and
"nothing is more strongly evincive of this truth, than that it has gone into
general desuetude.." 4
Another example of extratextual reference to natural law is offered in
the case of Chisholm v. Georgia,"5 which upheld the right of a citizen of one
state to sue another state. Although the matter could have been easily
resolved by simple reference to the Constitution, 16 Justice Wilson relied upon
three "touchstones" to justify the asserted right: "general jurisprudence," the
law of nations, and the Constitution of the United States."7 In the first
touchstone, Justice Wilson noted:
[11n the science of politics there has very frequently been a strong current
against the natural order of things, and an inconsiderate or an interested
disposition to sacrifice the end to the means. As the State has claimed
precedence of the people; so, in the same inverted course of things, the
Government has often claimed precedence of the State .... 118
A proper recognition of state sovereignty, he reasoned, would find that "laws
derived from the pure source of equality and justice must be founded on the
consent of those, whose obedience they require."".9  The constitutional
analysis likewise was replete with natural law references. Admitting that the
state is the "noblest work of man," but calling "man... the noblest work of
God,'"'2 Justice Wilson reasoned that the people ordained and established the
Constitution, and by that charter vested the judiciary with power over the
state. The textual commitment of the judiciary with power over the state was
consistent with the "natural order of things," for "[clauses, and not parties to
causes, are weighed by justice, in her equal scales: On the former solely, her
113. See Hylton, 3 U.S. at 255 (Paterson, J.).
114. Id.
115. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793). There is extensive commentary on the natural law
underpinnings of Justice Wilson's opinion in Chisholm. See, e.g., WILLIAM R. CASTRO, THE
SUPREME COURT IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC: THE CHIEF JUSTICESHIPS OF JOHN JAY AND OLIVER
ELLSWORTH 195 (1995); CURRIE, supra note 110, at 15-17; Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Elusive
Foundation: John Marshall, James Wilson, and the Problem of Reconciling Popular Sovereignty and Natural
Law Jurisprudence in the New Federal Republic, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 113, 176-184 (2003).
116. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 ("The judicial power shall extend to ... controversies... between a
State and citizens of another State.").
117. Chisholm, 2 U.S. at 466 (Wilson, J.).
118. Id. at 455.
119. Id. at 458.
120. Id. at 462-63.
attention is fixed: To the latter, she is ... blind.'.2  As for the law of nations,
Justice Wilson reviewed the right to sue the sovereign from the practice of
ancient Greece to his present day and found nothing to contradict his con-
clusion.'22 Quoting the King of Prussia, he considered state practice
consistent with the dictates of justice, for "all men ought to obtain justice;
since in the estimation of justice, all men are equal; whether the Prince
complain of a peasant, or a peasant complain of the Prince."'2
Justice Wilson's (and Chief Justice Jay's)' reliance on comparative and
international material was pointedly criticized by other Justices, with Justice
Blair contending that the likeness of "European confederations" to our own
"is not sufficiently close to justify any analogical application" and that, in any
event, European precedents "are utterly destitute of any binding authority
here.""'2 Justice Iredell likewise argued that "[nlo part of the Law of Nations
can apply to this case" and that resolution of the case should be based on con-
stitutional authority.'26 "If upon a fair construction of the Constitution" the
power exists, it may be exercised; if constitutional authority was lacking how-
ever, then "ten thousand examples of similar powers would not warrant its
assumption."'27
Even if much of Justice Wilson's opinion might be dismissed as "persi-
flage" by modem standards, it underscores that at the time, prominent
Justices believed "general jurisprudence, sound policy, and the experience of
other nations were.., immediately relevant to the interpretation of our writ-
ten Constitution. '' 28
The decline of natural law interpretations of the Constitution in the
nineteenth century is well documented.'29 Suffice it to say that in the crucible
of the abolitionist movement, natural law interpretations of the Constitution
121. Id. at 466.
122. Id. at 461.
123. Id. at 460.
124. Chief Justice Jay examined the differences between the concepts of sovereignty in Europe
and the United States to elucidate the nature of sovereignty generally as well as to judge whether the
prerogatives of sovereignty allowed in Europe are essential ingredients of sovereignty in the United
States. He concluded that the nature of sovereignty in Europe, which is based on feudal powers of
the Prince, differs sharply from sovereignty in the United States, which is based on compact.
Therefore the respective prerogatives of sovereignty likewise must differ. Id. at 471-72 (Jay, C.J.).
125. Id. at 450 (Blair, J.).
126. Id. at 449 (Iredell, J.). Justice Iredell did concede that that treaty law may be
applicable to furnish rules of interpretation. Id.
127. Id.
128. CURRIE, supra note 110, at 15.
129. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, The Vanishing Constitution, 103 HARV. L. REV. 43, 65-68
(1988); William E. Nelson, The Impact of the Antislavery Movement Upon Styles of Judicial Reasoning
in Nineteenth Century America, 87 HARV. L. REv. 513 (1974); Sherry, supra note 106, at 1175-76.
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went into abeyance. As late as 1829 the Court could declare the natural law
pronouncement that "[t]he fundamental maxims of a free government seem
to require, that the rights of personal liberty and private property should be
held sacred."'30  But the abolitionist movement placed in opposition the
sacred rights of property and liberty, with natural law advocates arguing both
sides of slavery question.' By the mid-1800s the Court rejected natural law
appeals to abolish slavery, concluding that matters of justice are best left to
the political branches. As the Court put it in Dred Scott,
[iut is not the province of the court to decide upon the justice or injus-
tice, the policy or impolicy, of these laws. The decision of that ques-
tion belonged to the political or law-making power; to those who
formed the sovereignty and framed the Constitution. The duty of the
court is, to interpret the instrument they have framed, with the best
lights we can obtain on the subject, and to administer it as we find it."'
What is less often discussed is the revival of natural law interpretations
of the Constitution in the twentieth century.' While the natural law con-
cept has diminished in American intellectual discourse, it has shown contin-
ued vitality "in the field of constitutional law.., woven into the fabric of due
process" jurisprudence.' If the early Court recognized extratextual natural
rights as a limit on legislative action, the modem Court finds in the inter-
stices of the text rights that are inherent but not enumerated. That is to say,
the trend toward collapsing fundamentality with constitutionalism has often
been animated by a generosity of spirit regarding the meaning behind the
text. As Justice Brennan put it, while the "text marks the metes and bounds
of official authority and individual autonomy," that text represents a "spar-
kling vision of the supremacy of the human dignity of every individual."'35
Visionary constitutionalism approaches textual guarantees expansively based
130. Wilkinson v. Leland, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 627, 657 (1829).
131. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 51
(1980).
132. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 405 (1856).
133. See George, supra note 103, at 2270-75, 2278-83 (discussing Griswold and natural law).
134. See BENJAMIN FLETCHER WRIGHT, AMERICAN INTERPRETATIONS OF NATURAL LAW
330-31 (1962); see also Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 230 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(arguing that liberty interests do not have their source in the Constitution or state law: "I had
thought it self-evident that all men were endowed by the Creator with liberty as one of the cardinal
unalienable rights. It is that basic freedom which the Due Process Clause protects .... ). But see
ELY, supra note 131, at 52 (arguing that natural law interpretations are no longer respectable in
constitutional adjudication).
135. Speech of Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. to the Text and Teaching Symposium, at
Georgetown University (Oct. 12, 1985), reprinted in THE GREAT DEBATE: INTERPRETING OUR
WRITTEN CONSTITUTION 18 (The Federalist Soc'y 1986).
on overarching themes and grand designs that echo natural law principles,
challenging "the capacity of our constitutional structure to foster and protect the
freedom, the dignity, and the rights of all persons within our borders.' '36
Similarly, Ronald Dworkin's "moral reading" of the Constitution pours natural
law wine into the wineskin of originalism with the view that the Framers
intended to enact general principles and that these principles should be con-
strued maximally at the "most general possible level" of abstraction."3' Abstract,
moral readings of the Constitution thus permit the Court to fashion principles to
reach "right" results contrary to original standards, historical experience, or
modem majoritarian impulses.' The Supreme Court likewise embraces natural
law approaches to constitutionalism when it pronounces that the constitutional
demands for autonomy require recognition of the libertarian choice to "define
one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery
of human life. Beliefs about these matters could not define the attributes of
personhood were they formed under compulsion of the State."'39 Thus, while not
espousing natural law per se, the Court has embraced catch phrases that are
sub silentio surrogates of the principle. 1
40
136. Id. at 20; see also MARTIN EDELMAN, DEMOCRATIC THEORIES AND THE CONSTITUTION
171-77 (1984) (discussing Justice Douglas' natural law approach and his conception of the
Constitution's "grand design").
137. RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN
CONSTITLMON 7-9 (1996). For a critique of the maximalist approach of Dworkin' moral reading of the
Constitution, see Gregory Bassham, Freedom's Politics: A Review Essay of Ronald Dworkin's Freedom's Law:
The Moral Reading of the American Constitution, 72 NOTRE DAMEL. REV. 1235, 1246-58 (1997).
138. Ronald Dworkin, The Arduous Virtue of Fidelity: Orignalism, Scalia, Tribe, and Nerve, 65
FORDHAM L REv. 1249, 1253 (1997) (discussing the choice between "abstract, principled, moral reading"
and inconsistent, "concrete, dated readings" in constitutional interpretation); Michael W. McConnell, The
Importance of Humility in Judicial Review: A Comment on Ronald Dworkin's "Moral Reading" of the
Constitution, 65 FORDHAM L REv. 1269, 1276-77 (1997). In so doing, Dworkin "liberate[s] judges to
achieve their own vision of the 'best answers' to controversial questions without regard to the Framers'
opinions, while simultaneously claiming to be faithfully carrying out the Framers' intentions." Id. at 1281.
139. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 574 (2003) (quoting Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S.
833, 851 (1992)); see also DWORKIN, supra note 137, at 104-12 (discussing attempts to identify a "textual
home" for an autonomy right); Jason S. Marks, Beyond Penumbras and Emanations: Fundamental Rights, The
Spirit of the Revolution, and the Ninth Amendment, 5 SETON HALL CONST. LJ. 435,486 (1995) (arguing that
the notion that an individual is "entitled to a sphere of personal autonomy that prevents government
imposition of morality when such a constraint affects personal issues related primarily to religion" is a
"modem analogue of precepts of natural law" that are "explicit conditions of the social compact that guide
constitutional interpretation without regard to the textual location of a particular right"); Stephen B.
Presser, Some Thoughts on Our Present Discontents and Duties: The Cardinal, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.,
The Unboro, The Senate, and Us, 1 AVE MARIA L. REv. 113, 114 (2003) (discussing theological
underpinnings of the "mystery passage").
140. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 511 n.4 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting)
(identifying various catchwords and catchphrases the Court has used that connote principles of natural
justice); George, supra note 103, at 2274-75 ('Natural law' jurisprudence by any other name remains
natural law jurisprudence.").
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The most obvious modem variation of a natural law theory of constitu-
tionalism is found in the substantive due process jurisprudence of implicit
ordered liberty. 4' The natural law roots behind this doctrine are
underappreciated. As David Currie noted-citing parallels to the Chase-
Iredell debate in Calder v. Bul142-"[iln practice ... some of the Court's more
recent decisions under. . . 'substantive due process' raise the question
whether it is paying lip service to Iredell for the sake of appearances while
effectively following Chase."'4 While the "implicit ordered liberty" doctrine
echoes eighteenth-century natural law jurisprudence, its modem origins are to
be found in the early twentieth-century cases of Twining v. New Jersey'" and
Palko v. Connecticut.4'
In Twining, the Court equated "due process of law" with provisions in
the Magna Carta that prohibit the taking, imprisonment, or exile of any
freeman without the lawful judgment of his peers or "the law of the land."'"
Twining thus affirmed the notion that due process might be defined by refer-
ence to fundamental principles that delimit governmental action from
changing "ancient procedures." For the Court in Twining, due process of law
reflects certain "immutable principles of justice which inhere in the very idea
141. See JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONsTITUIONAL LAW 433 (6th ed.
2000). Nowak and Rotunda write:
Today the Justices of the Supreme Court will apply strict forms of review under the due
process clauses and the equal protection clause to any governmental actions which limit the
exercise of "fumdamental" constitutional rights.... Little more can be said to accurately
describe the nature of a fundamental right, because fundamental rights analysis is simply no
more than the modem recognition of the natural law concepts first espoused by Justice Chase
in CaLder v. Bull.
Id.; see also Stanley Morrison, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights, 2 STAN. L
REV. 140, 165 (1949) (arguing that the "true source" of substantive due process is found "in concepts of
natural law," which, although "historically separate from the English concept of due process," has "by
judicial fiat been grafted upon the venerable phrase").
142. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798).
143. CURRIE, supranote 110, at 48.
144. 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
145. 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
146. Twining, 211 U.S. at 100 (citation omitted). From these historical origins, the Court drew
the following conclusions regarding the Due Process Clause:
First. What is due process of law may be ascertained by an examination of those settled usages
and modes of proceedings existing in the common and statute law of England before the
emigration of our ancestors .... Second. It does not follow, however, that a procedure settled
in English law at the time of the emigration, and brought to this country and practiced by our
ancestors, is an essential element of due process of law .... Third. But, consistently with the
requirements of due process, no change in ancient procedure can be made which disregards
those fundamental principles, to be ascertained from time to time by judicial action, which
have relation to process of law and protect the citizen in his private right, and guard him
against the arbitrary action of government.
Id. at 100-01.
of free government."'147 Fundamental principles relating to the process of law
and protection of private rights must be safeguarded from arbitrary govern-
ment action, and the identification of those fundamental principles should be
determined by settled usages and modes of procedure. What is particularly
significant about Twining is the notion that due process rights are ancient,
natural, preexisting rights that are part of the very order of free societies.
In Palko, the Court expanded on Twining and articulated a jurisprudence
of "ordered liberty" as a basis for due process guarantees.'48 The Court reasoned
that certain rights, in particular the right to trial by jury, may be of great value
and importance, but "not of the very essence of a scheme of ordered liberty. To
abolish [the right to trial by jury] is not to violate a 'principle of justice so rooted
in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.'
Few would be so narrow or provincial as to maintain that a fair and enlightened
system of justice would be impossible without [it]."'49 Relying on Twining, the
Court in Palko suggested that a "study and appreciation of the meaning.., of
liberty itself' could identify certain rights as so systemically essential that
"justice would perish" if those rights were abridged.'50
A decade later, Justice Black famously ridiculed the natural law under-
pinnings of Twining and Palko in arguing for full incorporation of the Bill of
Rights upon the states. Rather than accepting Twining's rule that would apply
none of the Bill of Rights to the states, or Palko's rule that would selectively
incorporate them provided the right was implicit in ordered liberty, Justice
Black argued in dissent in Adamson v. California' that relying on natural law
principles "to hold that this Court can determine what, if any, provisions of the
Bill of Rights will be enforced, and if so to what degree, is to frustrate the great
design of a written Constitution."''
147. Id. at 102.
148. The question addressed in Palko was whether the double jeopardy immunity was
applicable to the states by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court noted that the Due
Process Clause may make it unlawful for a state to abridge liberties embodied in the Bill of Rights,
recognizing that in "these and other situations immunities that are valid as against the federal
government by force of the specific pledges of particular amendments have been found to be implicit
in the concept of ordered liberty, and thus, through the Fourteenth Amendment, become valid as
against the states." Palko, 302 U.S. at 324-25. The Court attempted to fashion a line that divided
liberties as falling within or without this rationalizing principle.
149. Id. at 325-26 (citation omitted).
150. Id. at 326.
151. 332 U.S. 46 (1947).
152. Id. at 89-90 (Black, J., dissenting). For Justice Black, a "natural law" formula is an
incongruous excrescence on our Constitution that "subtly conveys to courts, at the expense of
legislatures, ultimate power over public policies in fields where no specific provision of the
Constitution limits legislative power." Id. at 75.
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Nonetheless, the concept of implicit ordered liberty continued to be
cited with regularity and now is part of the fundamental canon of modem
substantive due process. In many respects, Justice Harlan was the midwife
in this rebirth through his dissent in Poe v. Ullman'53 and his concurrence in
Griswold. In Poe, Justice Harlan recognized substantive due process
"embrace[s] those rights 'which are. . . fundamental, which belong.., to the
citizens of all free governments."' 54 Citing Palko's progeny, Harlan noted
that the right to privacy "is part of the 'ordered liberty' assured against state
action by the Fourteenth Amendment."'55  "[Bly common understanding
throughout the English-speaking world," he continued, "the privacy of the
home" must be "granted to be a most fundamental aspect of 'liberty."' 56
Subsequently in Griswold, Justice Harlan grounded a right to privacy in the
Due Process Clause, which embraces "basic values 'implicit in the concept
of ordered liberty."' 57 For Justice Harlan, penumbras and emanations from
other constitutional provisions are unnecessary; the privacy right in the
Due Process Clause stands on its own bottom."'s
Following Griswold, the concept of implicit ordered liberty has been
cited numerous times in substantive due process jurisprudence."9 Thus, from
Twining to the present, an evolution of the "natural law due process" has
occurred by which the Court has freed
itself from the limits of a written Constitution and set[ ] itself loose to
declare any law unconstitutional that.., violates the principles
"implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." While this approach has
been frequently used in deciding so-called "procedural" questions, it
153. 367 U.S. 497 (1961).
154. Id. at 541 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (citing Corfield v. Coryell, 6 Fed. Cas. 546 (E.D. Pa.
1823) (No. 3230)).
155. Id. at 549.
156. Id. at 548.
157. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 500 (1961) (Harlan, J., concurring) (quoting
Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319,325 (1937)).
158. Not surprisingly, Justice Black strongly dissented in Griswold and specifically attacked
Justice Harlan's invocation of "catch phrases" to strike down under the Fourteenth Amendment laws
that offend notions of natural justice. In his view, such formulas based on natural justice require
judges to determine what is or is not constitutional on the basis of their own appraisal of which laws
are unwise or unnecessary. Id. at 511-12 (Black, J., dissenting). There is extensive modem
commentary on the natural law arguments of Justice Black's dissent in Griswold. See, e.g., James E.
Fleming, Fidelity to Natural Law and Natural Rights in Constitutional Interpretation, 69 FORDHAM L.
REV. 2285 (2001); Robert P. George, The Natural Law Due Process Philosophy, 69 FORDHAM L. REV.
2301 (2001); George, supra note 103, at 2270-75, 2278-83.
159. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 592-93 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Chavez
v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 775, 787, 788 (2003); Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721, 727,
765 (1997); Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 295, 341 (1990); Bowers v.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191,194 (1986); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,152 (1973).
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has evolved into a device as easily invoked to declare invalid
"substantive" laws that sufficiently shock the consciences of at least
five members of this Court.'60
The great ghosts that haunt natural law understandings of substantive
due process are indeterminacy and judicial hegemony. As Justice Black
feared, "[s]uperimposing the natural justice concepts on the Constitution's
specific prohibitions could operate as a drastic abridgement of democratic
safeguards they embody.. 6. In so doing, the application of a natural law con-
cept "makes judges the supreme arbiters of the country's laws and practices. ' 2
For a majority of the justices, unenumerated constitutional rights are deemed
appropriate as constitutional guarantees because they are experienced rights
fundamental to the natural political order of free societies. And as experi-
enced rights, one can safeguard against judicial overreaching by examining
asserted due process rights through the prism of our history, traditions, and
values. As Justice Harlan put it, judicial self-restraint is achieved "by continual
insistence upon respect for the teachings of history, solid recognition of the
basic values that underlie our society, and wise appreciation of the great roles
that the doctrines of federalism and separation of powers have played in
establishing and preserving American freedoms.' 63
The fear of indeterminacy has only intensified since Griswold. Doctrines
of judicial self-restraint have been proposed and finally adopted in the
substantive due process test of Washington v. Glucksberg.' Glucksberg cabins
substantive due process into the conjunctive obligation of finding fundamental
rights only if they are "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" and "deeply
rooted in this Nation's history and tradition." '65 If the liberty interest is not
fundamental, it may be abridged pursuant to a validly enacted law if that law is
rationally related to a legitimate state interest.166 This approach, the Court
emphasized, "tends to rein in the subjective elements that are necessarily
present in due process judicial review.' ' 67 In addition, by establishing a threshold
requirement of fundamental rights, the Court has resisted expansion of the
concept of substantive due process, recognizing that "guideposts for responsible
decisionmaking in this unchartered area are scarce and open-ended.' 68 Thus,
160. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 381-82 (1970) (Black, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
161. Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310,325 (1945) (Black, J., separate opinion).
162. Id. at 326.
163. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 501 (Harlan, J., concurring).
164. 521 U.S. 702.
165. Id. at 721 (quotations omitted).
166. Id. at 722.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 720 (quoting Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992)).
668
in Glucksberg, the Court examined our history and tradition "to conclude that
the asserted 'right' to assistance in committing suicide is not a fundamental
liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause." '169 It also looked at the
practice elsewhere to conclude "almost every State-indeed, in almost every
western democracy-it is a crime to assist a suicide."'17
Occasionally, the Court has referenced the practices of other nations in
attempting to understand implicit ordered liberty.' "If neither liberty nor
justice would exist if the right were sacrificed, then comparative examples
[may be] offered to buttress or betray the argument that the right is funda-
mental." ''7 For example, the Court in Rochin v. California'73 defined due
process protections as encompassing immunities rooted in the traditions of
our people or implicit in the concept of ordered liberty. Such canons of
decency express notions of "justice of English-speaking peoples even toward
those charged with the most heinous offenses."'74 The Court adverted similar
construction in Wolf v. Colorado'75 when it indicated that due process exacts
all that is "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty."'76 It is a "compendious
expression for all those rights which the courts must enforce because they are
basic to our free society."'77 Such basic rights are "eternal verities" consistent
with the "human rights enshrined in the history and the basic constitutional
documents of English-speaking peoples.' 78
More recently in Bowers v. Hardwick,'79 the Court refused to locate a
fundamental right in implicit ordered liberty, concluding that "[piroscriptions
against that conduct have ancient roots" and that in light of these
proscriptions, "to claim that a right to engage in such conduct is. . . 'implicit
in the concept of ordered liberty' is, at best, facetious.'.80 Justice Burger in his
concurrence was even more explicit in his comparative analysis. After
169. Id. at 728.
170. Id. at 710.
171. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 576 (2003); Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 710-
21, 730-34; Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 369 n.1 (1989); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S.
186, 192-94 (1986); id. at 197 (Burger, J., concurring); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 673
n.42 (1977); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 169 (1952); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27-
28 (1949); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 326 n.3 (1937).
172. Alford, supra note 6, at 921.
173. 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
174. Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401,417 (1945) (Frankfurter, J., separate opinion); see
also Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 n.14 (1968); Rochin, 342 U.S. at 169.
175. 338 U.S. 25.
176. Id. at 27.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 27-28; see also Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 673 n.42; Duncan, 391 U.S. at 149 n.14.
179. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
180. Id. at 192, 194.
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reviewing Roman law, English law, and early American law, Chief Justice
Burger reasoned that "[t]o hold that the act of homosexual sodomy is some-
how protected as a fundamental right would be to cast aside millennia of
moral teaching."'81
The most noteworthy reference to comparative material in recent dec-
ades is found in Lawrence v. Texas. In Lawrence, the Court cited a decision of
the European Court of Human Rights, Dudgeon v. United Kingdom,'82 to show
that "[tihe sweeping references by Chief Justice Burger to the history of
Western civilization and to Judeo-Christian moral and ethical standards did
not take account of other authorities pointing in an opposite direction."'' 3 It
also referenced Dudgeon's progeny as evidence that "[t]o the extent Bowers
relied on values we share with a wider civilization, it should be noted that the
reasoning and holding in Bowers have been rejected elsewhere."' 84
As I have suggested elsewhere, Lawrence's appeal to comparative mate-
rial is comprehensible only when considered from the perspective of natural
law understandings of implicit ordered liberty.' The right is implicit in
ordered liberty as suggested by Lawrence's reference to Western civilization.
The Court critiqued Bowers' reliance on the history of Western civilization
for its failure to account for opposing authorities.' 6 Most important among
these was the European Court of Human Rights' decision in Dudgeon v.
United Kingdom, binding in forty-five countries. Thus, the Court noted that
Bowers "relied on values we share with a wider civilization" to establish that
the right is not implicit in ordered liberty.' 7 In addition, Lawrence implied
that other indicators from that wider civilization establish this element of
substantive due process. 8 This right, the Court stated, is "an integral part of
human freedom in many other countries"' -an approximation of the notion
that this interest is of the "very essence of a scheme of ordered liberty."'90
It is curious that the Court's reliance on implicit ordered liberty was so
opaque. The Court never identified the test that it was using, leading some
to question whether the Court was basing its decision on rational basis review
181. Id. at 197.
182. 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (set. A) (1981).
183. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 572 (2003).
184. Id. at 576.
185. Alford, supra note 6, at 927. That argument assumes that the Court viewed the
asserted right as fundamental and that it engaged in a Glucksberg substantive due process analysis.
Both of these propositions are controversial. Id. at 922 n.59.
186. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 572-73.
187. Id. at 576.
188. Id. at 576-77.
189. Id. at 577.
190. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
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or strict scrutiny.9 ' A careful reading of the opinion, however, underscores that
much of the decision attempts to ground the reasoning in our history and
tradition,'92 and that references to foreign laws and practices were offered to
rebut Bowers' finding that the right was not part of ordered liberty given that
for millennia Western civilization has opposed the practice.9 Lawrence locates
the autonomy right in our national experience, and extends that right to
persons in homosexual relationships.'94 The Court confirms the correctness of
this step by looking to foreign laws and practices, which support the substantial
nature of the asserted right. Under this conception, the Court affirms that
"international decisions occasionally may be used to help understand implicit
ordered liberty, but that jurisprudence will simply reflect principles that are
embodied in the laws of all civilized nations, including our own.""'
But the natural law assertions that undergird the decision are not opaque.
Indeed, Lawrence suggests that natural law theory has continued currency in
constitutional jurisprudence. Liberty is defined in its broadest "transcendent
dimensions" to include "freedom of thought, belief, expression, and certain
intimate conduct."'96 Lawrence offers a theory of constitutional anthropology
that endows personhood with the freedom to define "one's own concept of
existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life."'97
191. Justice Scalia argues that the Court is engaging in "an unheard-of form of rational-basis review
that will have far-reaching implications beyond this case." Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 586 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting); see also Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas, The "Fundamental Right" That Dare Not Speak Its
Name, 117 HARV. L REv. 1893, 1916-17 (2004) (arguing the Court adopted a fundamental rights
analysis); Leading Cases: Constitutional Law, 117 HARV.LREV. 226,306 (2003) ("If... government has no
legitimate interest, then its interest cannot be compelling.... Absent a compelling interest, the direct
infringement of a fundamental right is unconstitutional, no matter how narrowly tailored.").
192. See Eric L. Muller, Constitutional Conscience, 83 B.U. L. REV. 1017, 1065 n.341 (2003).
Muller writes:
Beneath the open-textured and aspirational tone of Lawrence... lies a continued intense
interest in the historical pedigree of claimed fundamental freedoms .... [While] important
areas of disagreement remain about how to go about the historical inquiry ... Lawrence
does not purport to renounce an interest in history and tradition in the process of
determining the scope of Due Process Clause's substantive coverage.
Id.
193. See Alford, supra note 6, at 916-17; Breyer Scalia Debate, supra note 1 (Justice Breyer
remarking that the reason Lawrence cited the European Court of Human Rights was because in
Bowers "the Court had made the claim that homosexual sodomy is almost universally forbidden").
194. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 573-74.
195. Alford, supra note 6, at 928. "[T]his is not to imply that Lawrence is without problems
from the perspectives of classical substantive due process jurisprudence." Id. at 923-24.
196. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562.
197. Id. at 514 (citations omitted). One critic described Casey's "mystery passage," cited by
Lawrence, as "fl[ying] in the face of all that the Founders meant by 'ordered liberty' including the
"truths of what the Declaration of Independence calls the 'Laws of Nature and of Nature's God."'
Richard J. Neuhaus, Rebuilding the Civil Public Square, 44 LOY. L. REV. 119, 125 (1998). Neuhaus
argued that such passages "deserve the closest attention, for they reveal the underlying
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"[M]ore than any other decision in the Supreme Court's history" Lawrence also
"presuppose[s] and advance[s] an explicitly equality-based... theory of
substantive liberty."'98  It all but embraces a Millean libertarianism that
counsels against state attempts to impose relational boundaries absent injury
to persons or protected institutions.'"
But like all decisions grounded on natural law concepts, the "singular
vagueness" that permits invocation of metaphysical principles to support con-
stitutional propositions also has the distinct disadvantage of its transparent
indeterminacy. °" Thus, what historically was recognized as a crime against
nature is now constitutionally protected as a component of "universal dig-
nity." '' A hundred years ago, the economic theory that "[e]very man has
freedom to do all that he wills, provided he infringes not the equal freedom of
any other man ' O° was famously ridiculed as having no location in our
Constitution, 203 but now that same Constitution has enshrined the ethical
assumptions of the Court--or at least of some on the Court-about the relationship between law
and moral judgment." Id.
198. Tribe, supra note 191, at 1898.
199. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567; see id. at 599 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Tribe, supra note 191,
at 1938 & n.174 (denying that the Fourteenth Amendment has ever been confused by any Court
majority with a charter of pure liberal individualism, but conceding that libertarians will "claim
Lawrence as a victory for their camp"); text accompanying infra note 204.
200. ELY, supra note 131, at 50 (quoting CHARLES HANES, THE REVIVIAL OF NATURAL
LAW CONCEPTS, at vii-viii (1930)).
201. Tribe, supra note 191, at 1898. Even as Lawrence embraces an indeterminate constitutional
theory of personal autonomy, it does not begin to answer critics of Millean libertarianism, such as Lord
Devlin's well known query:
If the statement that "there must remain a realm of private morality and immorality, which is,
in brief and crude terms, not the law's business"... is really meant as a statement of principle
to include other immoralities besides the homosexual, every practical reformer before he
makes use of it will want to be told what else it embraces.... What those interested in reform
will want to know is whether, if the principle is conceded in the case of homosexuality, some
other and what parts of the existing criminal law will be carried away as well.
PATRICK DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS 139 (1965). Those sympathetic with the decision,
however, have made halting attempts at discernible distinctions. For example, Laurence Tribe
distinguishes between sodomy, on the one hand, and incest, adultery and bigamy on the other, based on
the insignificant number of persons implicated, which he contends "cut no wide swath through the
population to limit the options open to any particular oppressed minority." Tribe, supra note 191, at
1944. Tribe offers no basis for distinguishing the size of the affected group as having constitutional
relevance, as if minority groups that are more discrete and insular somehow deserved lesser protection.
Nor does he provide any data to support the proposition that those who, say, commit adultery are larger
or smaller in number than those who practice homosexual sodomy. In any event, Tribe argues that such
questions should be saved for a later day, ignoring the theoretical difficulties that for decades have
bedeviled attempts to draw principled distinctions between different types of moral legislation.
202. HERBERT SPENCER, SOCIAL STATICS; OR, THE CONDITIONS ESSENTIAL TO HUMAN
HAPPINESS SPECIFIED, AND THE FIRST OF THEM DEVELOPED 121 (1872).
203. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("[Tihe
Fourteenth Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics.").
principle that "the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised
over any member of a civilized community against his will is to prevent harm
to others."2"4 Why is one ethic an unprotected liberty interest but the other
of its very essence? Certainly one could appeal to natural law principles to
justify invocation of either as a fundamental interest. Both Spencer and Mill
are legitimate, indeed parallel, conceptions of the good. Deprivation of prop-
erty interests, like liberty interests, requires due process. One cannot explain
the disconnect without conceding the transparent indeterminacy of the con-
stitutional due process interest.
While Lawrence is most comprehensible when viewed through the lens
of implicit ordered liberty, the Court's broader natural law ruminations
include language that advances comparativism far beyond its traditional
analogical bounds."5 The Court reasoned that "[t]he right the petitioners
seek in this case has been accepted as an integral part of human freedom in
many other countries. There has been no showing that in this country the
governmental interest in circumscribing personal choice is somehow more
legitimate or urgent."2" Under this conception it is of little moment that in
this country the state has always asserted the right to circumscribe such
choice. This approach of "unexperienced rights" would suggest that implicit
ordered liberty may be identified in other systems of justice, and that it is
incumbent upon our political branches to justify a departure from liberty
rights guaranteed elsewhere but not experienced here. Concerns about insti-
tutional legitimacy would counsel that such an expansive role for compara-
tivism will not hold sway in future due process cases.207
With substantive due process, implicit ordered liberty offers an undeniable
link to the disfavored natural law constitutional tradition. That tradition
affords ample opportunity for constitutional comparativism. International law
is replete with claims of universality, and ordered societies structure themselves
consistent with general notions of fairness and justice. As such, a natural law
approach to constitutionalism is perhaps the most coherent theory to advance
comparativist conceptions. The great obstacle of this approach is the obstacle
of history, which (with limited exception) has long relegated it to a disfavored
status in our constitutional system. That disfavor reflects a profound historical
skepticism about judicial overreaching and substantive indeterminacy.
204. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 22 (Longman, Roberts & Green 1864) (1859); see also
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567 (stating that liberty "counsel[s] against attempts by the State to... set
[relational] boundaries absent injury to a person or abuse of an institution the law protects").
205. See supra notes 185-190 and accompanying text.
206. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 577.
207. See Alford, supra note 6, at 929.
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ILL. MAJORITARIANISM
Majoritarianism is a constitutional theory that embraces sovereign
expressions of ordered society. The conservative version of majoritarianism
seeks a limited role for the Constitution, recognizing that any declaration of
unconstitutionality thwarts the will of the majority reflected in legislative and
executive action. The activist version of majoritarianism seeks to embody in
the text of the Constitution current contemporary standards, on the view
that the founding document is a living instrument embracing the broadest
ideals of our evolving national experience.
Although rarely recognized as such, these competing versions of consti-
tutional interpretation are both variations of majoritarianism. The most
common variety of majoritarianism concerns deference to the political
branches and limitations on judicial review. Structural majoritarianism rec-
ognizes that the political branches are the embodiment of our democratic sys-
tem of governance. "For most judges, most of the time, the principal
constraint on constitutional authority is not text, history, or even precedent,
but deference to the decisions of representative institutions in close cases.
2 0 8
Majoritarian rule is the core of the American governmental system. One of
the central tasks of constitutionalism has been to devise mechanisms for
promoting democratic rule while also "protecting minorities from majority
tyranny" consistent with those demands.2"
Interpretive majoritarism is another variation of majoritarianism, albeit
one that concerns the infusion of politics into law through malleable inter-
pretations of the Constitution that bring the text in line with the times.
When one speaks of a "living Constitution," one generally is embracing an
interpretative device that seeks to ensure consistency with contemporary
standards. The "living Constitution" is an organism that rarely swims
upstream. As one noted commentator put it,
[w]hat prevents the judicial recognition of additional individual rights
is usually not the text. Instead, it is the same thing that prevents their
explicit incorporation into the Constitution: the lack of any strong
national consensus in their favor .... In the end, society gets its way; if
we dislike the results, we must put most of the blame on our contem-
poraries rather than the Framers.210
208. McConnell, supra note 138, at 1289.
209. ELY, supra note 131, at 7-8.
210. Daniel A. Farber, Our (Almost) Perfect Constitution, 12 CONST. COMMENT. 163,
163-65 (1995).
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A common feature of both structural majoritarianism and interpretive
majoritarianism is skepticism toward comparative material. Under the former,
deference to the political branches belies the need for comparative empirical
experiences; under the latter, the contemporary values that infuse malleable
interpretations of the Constitution are based on our own national experience,
not the community standards of some real or imagined global village.
A. Structural Majoritarianism
The moral argument for majoritarianism is political liberty in the
democratic order: the notion that our laws are not simply for the people, but
also of and by the people."' Rather than accepting the premise that we are
wards under the benevolent trusteeship of the Court, majoritarianism under-
stands that each citizen's ideas about justice and the public good are entitled
to an equal hearing. "[Tihe only way to show equal concern and respect is to
govern democratically, subject to constraints to which the people themselves
have agreed." '212
If the moral argument for majoritarianism is democracy, the legal argu-
ment for majoritarianism is structuralism-separation of powers and feder-
alism. As John Hart Ely put it, the structural design of the Constitution
assumes that
an effective majority will not inordinately threaten its own rights.., by
structuring decision processes.., to try to ensure, first, that everyone's
interest will be... represented ... at the point of substantive decision,
and second, that the processes of individual application will not be
manipulated so as to reintroduce in practice the sort of discrimination
that is impermissible in theory."
Thus, the process of constitutional decisionmaking ensures due regard for
majoritarian concerns, and appropriate protection of minority interests, par-
ticularly interests that reinforce and protect representation in the democratic
process. Judicial review that is consistent with the majoritarian premise generally
defers to the political branches, and imposes more exacting review of political
measures if they undermine participation in the process by representative parties.
There are a number of constitutional doctrines that support majoritari-
anism. The fundamental constitutional doctrine that promotes a structural
majoritarian conception is the presumption of constitutionality. To use the
211. See McConnell, supra note 138, at 1290.
212. Id. at 1290-91.
213. ELY, supra note 131, at 100-01.
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language of Carolene Products,214 under this conception, one presumes that facts
support legislative judgments, one assumes that the legislature has a rational
basis for its actions, and one imposes more searching judicial scrutiny only in
narrow circumstances in which participational values are undermined, such as
laws that infringe fundamental rights relating to political process or laws that
impose suspect classifications on discrete and insular minorities."'
The presumption of constitutionality rests on a "decent respect due to
the wisdom, the integrity, and the patriotism of the legislative body, by which
any law is passed, to presume in favour of its validity, until its violation of the
constitution is proved beyond all reasonable doubt."2"6 Since the earliest pro-
nouncements of this presumption, deference to Congress has been so com-
monly referenced by the Court as to become almost formulaic.217 Justice
Holmes described the practice of declaring congressional acts unconsti-
tutional the Court's "gravest and most delicate duty," such that if the statute
can be found to be constitutional the Court is duty-bound to so find." ' Today
the Court often begins its analysis with expressions of deference "customarily
[given] to the duly enacted and carefully considered decision[s] of a coequal
and representative branch of our Government." '219
As Chief Justice Rehnquist has put it, the presumption of constitu-
tionality "makes eminent good sense" because
if the Supreme Court wrongly decides that a law enacted by Congress is
constitutional, it has made a mistake, but the result of its mistake is only
to leave the nation with a law duly enacted by the popularly chosen
members of [Congress] ... and signed into law by the popularly chosen
president. But if the Supreme Court wrongly decides that a law enacted
by Congress is not constitutional, it has made a mistake of considerably
greater consequence; it has struck down a law duly enacted by the
popularly elected branches of government, not because of any principle in
the Constitution but because of the individual views of desirable policy
held by a majority of the nine justices at that time.22°
214. 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
215. Id. at 152 n.4.
216. Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 270 (1827).
217. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 704 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (discussing the
recitation of presumption of constitutionality as "almost formulary caution").
218. Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U.S. 142, 148 (1927).
219. Waiters v. Nat'l Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305,319 (1985); accord Bd. of Educ.
v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 251 (1990); U.S. Dep't of Labor v. Triplett, 494 U.S. 715, 721 (1990).
220. WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, THE SUPREME COURT: HOW IT WAS, HOW IT Is 318 (1987). But
see David M. Burke, The "Preswrption of Constiudnality" Docr& and the Rehnquist Court: A Lethal
Combination for Individua Liberty, 18 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POLy' 73, 81-82 (1994) (objecting to Rehnquist's
676 52 UCLA LAW REVIEW 639 (2005)
Constitutional Comparativism
He might also have added that a mistake of the former is easily corrected by
the demands of popular will to rescind an unjust law, but a mistake of the lat-
ter is compounded by the inability to alter that mistake except through the
extraordinary procedure of overruling the erroneous decision. As the Court
put it, "[tihe Constitution presumes that, absent some reason to infer
antipathy, even improvident decisions will eventually be rectified by the
democratic process and that judicial intervention is generally unwarranted no
matter how unwisely we may think a political branch has acted." ''2 The mis-
take of judicial deference lasts for a political season; the mistake of judicial
usurpation is fixed in the constitutional firmament.
The presumption of constitutionality finds concrete manifestation in
rational basis review. Under rational basis review, legislation is presumed
valid and will be sustained if the statute is rationally related to a legitimate
state interest. 222 Thus, in the due process context, if a liberty interest is not of
fundamental importance, the state and federal legislatures will be given "wide
latitude" to regulate such conduct. 3 While accepting that legislative action
224is not unfettered, in most contexts the Constitution "grants legislatures, not
courts, broad authority (within the bounds of rationality) to decide whom
they wish to help with their.., laws and how much help those laws ought to
provide., 22' As the Court put it recently, rational basis review-with its pre-
sumption favoring constitutionality-is "a paradigm of judicial restraint., 226
Even the Court's newfound willingness to invalidate legislative determi-
nations based on federalism concerns arguably signals not "a retreat from [a]
commitment to majority rule but rather an attempt to perfect it.22 7 Not only
is the Rehnquist Court arguably "invalidat[ing] purely symbolic legislation,
view that mistakenly declaring a Congressional act unconsequential is of greater consequence than
declaring the act constitutional).
221. FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 314 (1993) (quoting Vance v. Bradley,
440 U.S. 93, 97 (1979)).
222. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 722 (1997).
223. For example, if a city ordinance requires a police officer to be clean shaven, the Court will
uphold that requirement, recognizing that similarity in appearance of police officers is a desirable and
rationale objective. See Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 246-49 (1976).
224. Courts will examine government infringements of nonfundamental liberties to ensure that
they have some rational basis. Moreover, in the case of criminal laws, courts will seek to ensure that
some notice has been provided to individuals concerning the proscribed conduct and that some
limitations have been imposed on police discretion. See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41
(1999) (striking down loitering statute).
225. Fitzgerald v. Racing Ass'n of Cent. Iowa, 539 U.S. 103, 108 (2003).
226. Beach Communications, 508 U.S. at 314; see also Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 205 n.10
(2003) (quoting Bd. of Trs. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 383 (2001) (Breyer, J., dissenting)).
227. Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in the Administrative
State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461,481 n.99 (2003).
intended more to induce public support than to honor public preferences,,2 2 8 it is
doing so sensitive to the fact that state legislatures are more attuned to majority
preferences than the federal legislature. As one commentator put it, the modem
federalism cases recognize that with the "transfer [of] power ... from the
state... to the nation, political incentives shift."229  A decisionmaker in an
aggregated, national system representing more people is less likely to be sensitive
to localized, majority preferences than a decisionmaker in a disaggregated, state
system. "[Ilf we are worried about predicting structural risk, then it seems
uncontroversial to begin... with a presumption that a relatively more
disaggregated set of citizens is more likely, on average, to reflect more sensitive
accounts of majoritarian preference.""23 Under this conception, United States v.
Lopez 23 1 was an easy case because concerns about federalism reflect concerns
about majoritarianism."3
Structural majoritarianism is equally common in the solicitude granted
by the Court to actions of the executive branch. Various doctrines support
this deference. For example, under the presumption of regularity, "in the
absence of clear evidence to the contrary, courts presume that [public offi-
cials] have properly discharged their official duties. 233 This doctrine rests on
an assessment of the relative competence of the executive branch and also
concerns to avoid unnecessary impairment of core executive functions.234
The Court went further in the recent case of Cheney v. United States District
Court,23s granting extraordinary protections to the executive branch from
civil litigation, arguing it was not incumbent on the president to claim
executive privilege to avoid civil discovery because "the public interest
requires that [the Court] give recognition to the paramount necessity of
protecting the Executive Branch from vexatious litigation that might distract
it from the energetic performance of its constitutional duties. 236
228. Id.; see also Lisa Schultz Bressman, Disciplining Delegation After Whitman v. American
Trucking Ass'ns, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 452, 479 (2002) (discussing United States v. Lopez as an
instance of "symbolic response[] to public problems"); V.F. Nourse, Toward a New Constitutional
Anatomy, 56 STAN. L. REV. 835, 878, 880 n.171 (2004) (discussing federal statute that criminalizes
violence against women as not indicative of a truly majoritarian remedy and as "simply a way to gain
political favor in an election year without consideration of constitutional questions").
229. Nourse, supra note 228, at 875.
230. Id.
231. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
232. Nourse, supra note 228, at 876.
233. United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996) (quoting United States v.
Chemical Found. Inc., 272 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1926)).
234. Id. at 465.
235. Cheney v. Dist. Ct., 124 S. Ct. 2576 (2004).
236. Id. at 2588.
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Likewise, extreme deference to executive agency action supports the
majoritarian premise. All of the modem conceptions of the administrative
state support majoritarianism. The "interest group" approach reinforces
majoritarianism by promoting participation through notice-and-comment
rulemaking. "Agency decisions made after adequate consideration of all
affected interests ... have.., legitimacy based on the same principle as leg-
islation." '237 The "presidential model" seeks to ensure that administrative
policy decisions are accountable to the public through transparency and
presidential leadership that links the electorate with the bureaucrats.23s
Under the presidential model, "[wihatever administration holds office and
whatever regulatory vision that administration implements, the result repre-
sents the majority will. 239 Rules for judicial review of agency decisionmaking
likewise support majoritarianism. At the heart of Chevron deference 24 is a
concern about majoritarianism and political accountability.
While agencies are not directly accountable to the people, the Chief
Executive is, and it is entirely appropriate for this political branch of
the Government to make such policy choices .... In such a case, fed-
eral judges-who have no constituency-have a duty to respect
legitimate policy choices made by those who do.1
41
Moreover, the reason that the Court in United States v. Mead Corp.242
cabined Chevron deference was out of concern that not all agency action
reflected a congressional intent to delegate authority to issue interpretations that
carry the force of law.243 Congress contemplated that administrative action will
have the force of law only if procedures are in place that afford fairness and
deliberation, such as notice-and-comment rulemaking.4 Thus, the same
concerns about democratic participation that animate judicial deference to
237. Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV.
1667, 1712 (1975).
238. Bressman, supra note 227, at 485-86 (discussing presidential model); Elena Kagan,
Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2331-32 (2001) (discussing political
accountability of the presidential model through transparency and an "electoral link").
239. Bressman, supra note 227, at 491.
240. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat'l Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). Under
Chevron, a federal court must undertake a two-step process in which it first asks "whether
Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue." If so, the court "must give effect to
the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress." Second, if Congress expressed no intent on the
matter, or Congress' purpose and intent is unclear, the court must defer to the agency's
interpretation of the statute if it falls within the range of permissible construction. Id. at 842-43.
241. Id. at 865-66.
242. 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
243. Id. at 230-3 1; see also Bressman, supra note 227, at 536.
244. Mead, 533 U.S. at 230.
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legislative action likewise animate Chevron deference to administrative action if
formal procedures are in place to ensure democratic participation.
Structural majoritarianism is highly skeptical of the relevance of
comparative law in constitutional adjudication. In a number of recent cases
that reflect a structural majoritarian approach, the Supreme Court has been
invited to consider comparative material to resolve constitutional questions.
With remarkable frequency, the Court declines.
In the most recent case involving campaign finance reform, McConnell
v. FEC,245 the Court was invited in an amicus brief by international experts to
consider the practices of "peer nations" that have addressed inappropriate
financial influence in electoral politics. That comparative analysis revealed
that "the United States occupies an extreme end of the spectrum in
regulating the flow of money in electoral politics.""24 The brief argued that
campaign finance reforms would "incrementally nudge the American sys-
tem.., away from the fringe of international practice." '247 In a decision that
was extraordinarily deferential to congressional findings,24 the Court's
majority recognized that "proper deference" was required given "Congress'
ability to weigh competing constitutional interests in an area in which it
enjoys particular expertise." '249 As a result, the majority gave no recognition
whatsoever to the experiences in other countries."' Thus, while the decision
in McConnell was in many respects remarkable,"' it was commonplace in its
refusal to view the U.S. position as an intentional outlier in free speech pro-
tections as relevant. If majoritarian interpretations such as McConnell
245. 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
246. Brief of Amici Curiae International Experts et al. at 4, McConnell (02-1674).
247. Id. at 5.
248. See Bradley A. Smith, McConnell v. Federal Election Commission, Ideology Trumps
Reality, Pragmatism, 3 ELECTION L.J. 345, 350 (2004) ("[Tlhe extreme deference of the Court to
judgments by an obviously self-interested legislature effectively abdicates its policing
responsibility."); see also Lillian R. BeVier, McConnell v. FEC: Not Senator Buckley's First
Amendment, 3 ELECTION L.J. 127, 130 (2004) ("The argument for deference, which Justice
Stevens seems to have found persuasive, reflects the opposite attitude. It is based on the
conviction that systematic considerations cut against strict scrutiny because the 'political arena is
one in which the expertise of legislators is at its peak and that of judges is at its very lowest.').
249. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 137.
250. The only nod to comparativism was by Justice Scalia, who addressed the eighteenth-
century historical practice in Britain as evidence of the Framers' original understanding that
regulation of money used to fund speech constituted regulation of speech as such. Id. at 722-23
(Scalia, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part). Other justices were clearly cognizant of the
comparative arguments in McConnell. See Breyer Scalia Debate, supra note 1 (Justice Breyer
discussing amicus brief citations to comparative experiences involving campaign contributions
and the freedom of expression).
251. See Daniel R. Ortiz, The Unbearable Lightness of Being McConnell, 3 ELECTION L.J. 299,
299 (2004); Smith, supra note 248, at 350.
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presume extreme deference to congressional factfinding and expertise,252 it
follows that comparative experiences will be of limited utility in the Court's
interpretive approach.
Naturalization and immigration is another area in which the Court has
shown extreme deference to majoritarian concerns. In Demore v. Kim, 53 the
Court upheld detention of deportable criminal aliens as a valid exercise of
Congress' broad authority over naturalization and immigration,"4 notwith-
standing arguments that the practice violated international law. 5 The Court
deferred to Congress' approach, recognizing that while other approaches
(such as posting bail) might be less burdensome, the Court is not a legislature
charged with formulating public policy.256 "In the exercise of its broad power
over naturalization and immigration, Congress regularly makes rules that
would be unacceptable if applied to citizens." '257 Significantly, no Justice
accepted the invitation to rely on international or comparative law as rele-
vant to the inquiry.
258
Even Eldred v. Ashcroft,259 which proponents cite in support of consti-
tutional comparativism,2' actually has little to do with judicial comparativism
252. See Richard Briffault, McConnell v. FEC and the Transformation of Campaign Finance
Law, 3 ELECTION L.J. 147, 149 (2004). Briffault states:
McConnell appears to have placed the democracy-promoting features of campaign finance
law at the heart of the Court's analysis. The McConne/ majority clearly viewed many of
BCRA's restrictions and requirements not as burdens on speech but as desirable efforts to
promote democracy.... This democracy-centered perspective on.. . campaign finance law
was joined by a striking degree of judicial deference to Congress. The Court repeatedly
recognized Congress's 'particular expertise' concerning the impact of particular campaign
finance practices and their effects on both elections and government decision-making. The
Court expressed its willingness to give Congress "sufficient room to anticipate and respond
to concerns about circumvention of regulations designed to protect the integrity of the
electoral process." Indeed, the Court deferred to Congress not just with respect to political
facts and electoral predictions but also concerning the weight to be given to those facts and
predictions in balancing democracy-promoting regulatory interests against the speech and
associational rights of parties and interest groups.
Id. at 148-49 (citations omitted).
253. 538 U.S. 510 (2003).
254. Id. at 521-31.
255. Brief for Respondent at 40 n.39, Demore (No. 01-1491); Brief of Amici Curiae
International Human Rights Organizations, Demore (No. 01-149 1).
256. Demore, 538 U.S. at 528 (citing City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S.
425 (2002)).
257. Id. at 521 (citing Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 79-80 (1976)).
258. This is particularly noteworthy given that the statute was ambiguous, see id. at 578
(Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting ambiguity in statutory language), and
the Charming Betsy doctrine might counsel an interpretation that is consistent with international
law, see Brief of Amici Curiae International Human Rights Organizations at 15-22, Demote (No. 01-
1491). For a discussion of Charming Betsy, see infra note 404 and accompanying text.
259. 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
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and far more to do with deference to legislative attempts to secure
international uniformity. In Eldred, the Court upheld the Copyright Term
Extension Act of 1998 as a "rational exercise of the legislative authority
conferred by the Copyright Clause. 261  Recognizing that the Copyright
Clause requires substantial deference to Congress, the Court concluded that
the copyright extension reflects judgments of a kind Congress typically makes
and that are well within its legislative domain.262 A key factor Congress
considered in extending the copyright term was to "ensure that American
authors would receive the same copyright protection in Europe as their
European counterparts. 63  The Court concluded that the congressional
attempt to match the European Union's "life plus 70 years" provided a
rational basis for the conclusion that the extension promotes the primary
objective of the Copyright Clause, which is to promote the progress of sci-
ence.26 Thus, the Court did not sua sponte engage in comparativism to
uphold the statute, but it did recognize the legitimacy of Congress' own
review of the comparative landscape.
But consistent with structural deference, to say that Congress acted
rationally in matching foreign practices is not to say that it would have been
irrational for it to fail to match a foreign standard or to achieve international
uniformity. Even if such an approach were "very bad policy... [t]he wisdom
of Congress' action.., is not within [the Court's] province to second
guess. 265 Significantly, it is structural deference that led the Court to reject
Justice Breyer's heightened judicial review of copyright term extensions.
Justice Breyer reasoned that a copyright extension statute seriously restricts
the dissemination of speech and therefore more careful review of congres-
sional action was required.26  He examined the purported benefits of the
copyright extension-including the degree of international uniformity
created-and found these benefits illusory.267 In his view, it does not intrude
upon congressional authority "to find the statute unconstitutional on the
basis of ... the statute's apparent failure to provide significant international
260. See, e.g., Breyer, Keynote Address, supra note 1, at 265 n.4 (citing Eldred as an example of
instances in which the Court faces "an increasing number of domestic legal questions that directly
implicate foreign or international law").
261. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 204.
262. Id. at 205.
263. Id. at 205-06.
264. Id. at 205-06, 213.
265. Id. at 222.
266. Id. at 244 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
267. Id. at 257-260.
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uniformity. 2 68 The Court refused to examine whether Congress' attempt at
international uniformity was achieved, denying that it could subject this par-
ticular congressional action to heightened judicial scrutiny or that it had a role
of "alter[ing] the delicate balance Congress has labored to achieve." '269 Far from
imposing rational choices through comparative experiences, the Court simply
deferred to a congressional approach that imperfectly sought to achieve
international uniformity.
B. Interpretive Majoritarianism
As introduced above, another variation of majoritarianism concerns
living constitutionalism that attempts to infuse constitutional text with con-
temporary values. The sweep of contemporary experience will influence the
interpretive direction of the Court, such that the Court embraces-some
would say discovers-constitutional principles that are consistent with a
modem ethic,27 and repudiates decisions widely perceived as implausible or
illegitimate through new choices of constitutional principle.27" ' As Erwin
Chemerinsky noted: "Criticism of the Court throughout American history
has shaped beliefs about the proper role of the judiciary and in turn shaped its
jurisprudence." '272
In moments of unusual candor, the Court has conceded the weight of
public opinion on its decisionmaking power.
The Court's power lies.., in its legitimacy, a product of substance and
perception that shows itself in the people's acceptance of the Judiciary as
fit to determine what the Nation's law means and to declare what it
demands.... [T]he Court's legitimacy depends on making legally
principled decisions under circumstances in which their principled
character is sufficiently plausible to be accepted by the Nation.273
While its decisions must be perceived as legitimate, much of that legitimacy
derives from a confidence that its decisions are principled.274 The Court must
remain discretely attuned to the public square, but not overtly submissive to it.
Barry Friedman outlined the New Deal Court's "switch in time" as a
quintessential example of the Court's adaptation to majoritarian demands.27
268. Id. at 264.
269. Id. at 205 n.10 (quoting Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 230 (1990)).
270. See text accompanying infra notes 287-301.
271. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 861-64 (1992).
272. Chemerinsky, supra note 129, at 62.
273. Casey, 505 U.S. at 865-66.
274. Id. at 865.
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In the Roosevelt era, "[s]cholars and citizens favored judicial activism to
interpret the Constitution consistent with the needs of the times .... The
notion of a flexible Constitution became official administration policy during
the New Deal and strongly influenced popular understandings., 27 6 So suscep-
tible were the Justices to political pressure to approve economic legislation
that they were lampooned for doing mid-air somersaults and amending the
Constitution by the hour.277 If Congress wished to regulate in the economic
arena, the Court would no longer stand as an impediment. 27s Friedman con-
cludes: "It is difficult after 1937 to insist that there is a strict separation of law
and politics. ... The public in 1937 was ready for a change in constitutional
,,271
meaning... [and] seems to... have accepted it happily when it came.
Likewise, today "public comfort or discomfort will, ultimately, have some
impact on Supreme Court review and constitutional change. '
The Court's understanding of the machinations of New Deal economic
jurisprudence illuminates another example of interpretative majoritarianism
relating to stare decisis. One of the considerations the Court entertains in
determining whether to overrule a prior decision is whether the "facts have so
changed, or come to be seen so differently, as to have robbed the old rule
of... justification. 2.' The discussion in Casey of Lochner's demise illustrates
this consideration. Lochner embraced laissez-faire capitalism as a substantive
constitutional limitation, such that human welfare legislation was seen as an
infringement of the constitutionally protected liberty of contract. The lesson
of the Great Depression was that Lochner and its progeny "rested on funda-
mentally false.., assumptions about the capacity of a relatively unregulated
market to satisfy minimal levels of human welfare., 282 Laissez-faire capitalism
was "recognized everywhere outside the Court to be dead." '283 Therefore lib-
erty of contract must die. "Premised [on] a constitutional resolution of social
275. Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Four: Law's
Politics, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 971,1011-18 (2000).
276. Id. at 1016-17.
277. Id. at 1048, 1052.
278. Explaining the Court's rulings on the Commerce Clause, Justice Jackson wrote in 1942:
If we were to be brutally frank, I suspect what we would say is that in any case where
Congress thinks there is an effect on interstate commerce, the Court will accept that
judgment.... When we admit that it is an economic matter, we pretty nearly admit that
it is not a matter which courts may judge.
Barry Cushman, Formalism and Realism in Commerce Clause Jurisprudence, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 1089,
1146 (2000) (quoting Letter from Robert H. Jackson to Sherman Minton (Dec. 21, 1942)).
279. Friedman, supra note 276, at 1063.
280. Id. at 1064.
281. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 855 (1992).
282. Id. at 861-62.
283. Id. at 862.
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controversy [that] had proven to be untrue," a new choice of constitutional
principle was "not only justified but required."2" Thus, majoritarian interpre-
tations prevailed and, precedents notwithstanding, liberty of contract suc-
cumbed to political and social "facts." '285
One can cite numerous other examples of interpretive majoritarianism.
Indeed, the very notion that "community standards" should have constitutional
import is a concession to majoritarianism. In the context of the First
Amendment, obscenity is determined based on "contemporary community
standards." '287 Accepting that an abstract definition would not suffice, nor
would a standard based on the peccadilloes of the faint (or stout) of heart,288 the
word "obscene" was permitted to indicate, in the words of Learned Hand,
the present critical point in the compromise between candor and
shame at which the community may have arrived here and now....
... Such words as these do not embalm the precise morals of an
age or place; while they presuppose that some things will always be
shocking to the public taste, the vague subject-matter is left to the
gradual development of general notions about what is decent." 9
As such it is the "community" that determines whether certain categories of
speech are deserving of constitutional protection or subject to criminal prose-
cution. Of course, since its adoption in Roth v. United States," this standard
has always been controversial. The dissent in Roth argued that "[tihe standard
of what offends 'the common conscience of the community' conflicts... with
284. Id.
285. Id. at 855.
286. E.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311-317 (2002) (determining whether execution
of mentally retarded is cruel and unusual by reference to a national consensus against the practice);
BMW v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 595 (1996) (Breyer, J., concurring) ("[Als the majority opinion makes
clear, the record contains nothing to suggest that the extraordinary size of the [punitive damage]
award in this case is explained by the extraordinary wrongfilness of the defendant's behavior,
measured by historical or community standards, rather than arbitrariness or caprice."); Browning-
Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 264 n.4 (1989) ("The same basic mode of inquiry
should be applied in considering the scope of the Excessive Fines Clause as is proper in other Eighth
Amendment contexts, [which look to evolving standards of decency]"); Miller v. California, 413
U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (holding that in determining obscenity, courts must consider, inter alia, "whether
'the average person, applying contemporary community standards' would find that the work, taken as
a whole, appeals to the prurient interest" (citation omitted)); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101
(1958) (plurality opinion) ("The [Eighth] Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.").
287. Miller, 413 U.S. at 24; Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
288. Miller, 413 U.S. at 33 ("The primary concern.., is to be certain that... [material] will be
judged by its impact on an average person, rather than a particularly susceptible or sensitive person-
or indeed a totally insensitive one.").
289. United States v. Kennerley, 209 F. 119, 121 (S.D.N.Y. 1913).
290. Roth, 354 U.S. at 489.
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the command of the First Amendment .... Certainly that standard would not be
an acceptable one if religion, economics, politics, or philosophy were involved.
How does it become a constitutional standard when... sex is concerned?,
291
Even though conceding community standards might be appropriate, leading
scholars have recognized that localized standards may be unduly censorious, while
national standards are illusory.292 In truth, obscenity is a riddle whose legs are
wrapped around a mystery deep inside an enigma.2 93 One cannot "define what
may be indefinable., 294 But the message behind the method is not mysterious:
First Amendment obscenity jurisprudence is acutely sensitive to majoritarian
concerns about common understandings and general notions of sexual decency.
Interpretive majoritarianism has proven unsympathetic to the use of
comparative material to illuminate community standards. The Court has never
accepted the notion that "community" as a constitutional construct should be
defined so broadly as to encompass communities beyond our borders. For
example, in the First Amendment obscenity context, the Court's original
embrace of "contemporary community standards" in 1957 left the concept of
"community" undefined. Leading scholars of the day recognized the geographic
ambiguity in such a concept and queried whether the standard would be the
"local community... [or] the national community or even the larger
international community commonly called the western world?""29  Finding it
unimaginable that local standards should prevail, for "their application would
emasculate independent judicial review... [b]alkanize... literature in the
United States, and reduce art.., to the levels of the most Philistine communities
in the country," it was assumed that national standards would prevail.296 No
serious attempts were made to advocate for a global or western standard.
Subsequent cases clarified that obscenity prosecutions could proceed based on
offense to local rather than national sensibilities. "There is no constitutional
barrier under Miller to prohibiting communications that are obscene in some
communities under local standards even though they are not obscene in
others.
2 9 7
291. Id. at 511-12 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
292. See, e.g., William B. Lockhart & Robert C. McClure, Censorship of Obscenity: The
Developing Constitutional Standards, 45 MINN. L. REV. 5, 108-14 (1960) [hereinafter Lockhart &
McClure, Censorship of Obscenity]; William B. Lockhart & Robert C. McClure, Literature, The
Law of Obscenity and the Constitution, 38 MINN. L. REV. 295, 387-90 (1954).
293. Obscenity on the Internet has only increased the difficulty of identifying an
appropriate "community standard." See text accompanying infra notes 298-302.
294. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
295. Lockhart & McClure, Censorship of Obscenity, supra note 292, at 50.
296. Id. at 112-14.
297. Sable Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 125-26 (1989). That is, the Court
anticipates that a juror will apply common understandings of the average person in the community,
686
Constitutional Comparativism 687
The birth of the Internet generated renewed debate as to whether a
community standard was appropriate, and if so, whether that standard should
be localized or broader in scope. The great concern of regulating online por-
nography was that "the 'community standard' criterion as applied to the
Internet means that any communication available to a nationwide audience
will be judged by the standards of the community most likely to be offended by
the message. '  In Ashcroft v. ACLU,2 opponents of federal regulation of
indecent, nonobscene speech argued that local and national standards raised
significant problems, and that the Court should repudiate a community stan-
dard altogether as a basis for regulating online pornography." Nonetheless,
the Court disagreed, accepting that "contemporary community standards" was
an appropriate test for regulating online pornography."' While the decision as
to what constituted the appropriate geographic community was fragmented, no
Justice argued that the standard should refer to, or be based upon, a wider
community beyond our national borders." 2 Thus, in this most global of media,
drawing upon their own knowledge of the views of persons in that community or vicinage. See
Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 104 (1974).
298. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844,877-78 (1997).
299. 535 U.S. 564 (2002).
300. See, e.g., Brief of Volunteer Lawyers for the Arts et al. at 14, Ashcroft v. ACLU (No.
00-1293). The brief states:
[Tihere is no basis for requiring local business owners to comply with widely divergent
community standards throughout the country, particularly where they would have who
have little or no knowledge of such standards. In addition, as discussed above, unlike
sending mail to a zip code or a telephone message to an area code, it is not possible or
feasible for the vast majority of Internet speakers to control where their speech can be
received or to "tailor" their communications on a "selective basis." As a result, unlike the
other federal statutes cited by the petitioner, COPA would impermissibly impose a
national, lowest common denominator standard on a vast range of speakers, and on
communication and content that would be deemed "acceptable" in many communities
and was specifically protected under Miller.
Id. at 14. "Because present day technology does not permit a speaker [using the World Wide Web
to publish his works only to] specific geographic locales, reliance on a community standard
element to define proscribed content would necessarily lead to the most puritan view of what
constitutes prohibited speech." Id. at 12.
301. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. at 585 (holding federal law's "reliance on community
standards to identify 'material that is harmful to minors' does not by itself render the statute
substantially overbroad for purposes of the First Amendment"). The Court had previously accepted
that regulation of obscene material may be subject to a community standard. Id. at 574-75.
302. Justice Thomas, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia, expressed the
view that local community standards were constitutionally permissible, id. at 584-85 (Thomas, J.,
joined by Rehnquist, C.J., Scalia, J.) ("Congress has narrowed the range of content restricted by
COPA in a manner analogous to Miller's definition of obscenity... [and] any variance caused by
the statute's reliance on community standards is not substantial enough to violate the First
Amendment."), while Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer advocated
national standards, id. at 586 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (writing separately on constitutionality
and desirability of adopting a national standard); id. at 591 (Breyer, J., concurring) ("[A]
not a single Justice expressed the view that foreign standards were somehow
relevant to regulate sex on the Internet. As a constitutional matter, the
contemporary community is anything but a global village.
C. The Synthesis of Structural and Interpretive Majoritarianism
If there is a subject that is at the vanguard in the debate on consti-
tutional comparativism, it is the death penalty. Proponents maintain that
comparative experiences are decidedly relevant to the question of whether
capital punishment is constitutionality suspect.33 As one commentator put it,
"[dleath penalty jurisprudence provides one of the most dramatic examples of
th[e] synergy between international and domestic human rights law."3"
The critical constitutional inquiry in recent decades has been what
information the Court should consider in deciding whether the death penalty
is cruel and unusual. In making this determination, fierce disagreements have
ensued within the Court as to the relevance, if any, of contemporary stan-
dards of decency reflected in the practice in the United States and, more con-
troversially, world opinion as expressed by the practice of foreign states and
evolving international norms.
Death penalty jurisprudence reflects a synthesis of interpretive and
structural majoritarianism. Modem death penalty jurisprudence began in 1958
with the recognition in Trop v. Dues0 s that the Eighth Amendment "must
draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the
progress of a maturing society."3 6 In many respects, Trop displayed originalist
and natural law tendencies, citing the Eighth Amendment as firmly established
in the Anglo-American tradition dating back to the Magna Carta and noting
"[tihe basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment is nothing less than
the dignity of man."3 7 This approach makes room for historical comparativism
and broad conceptions of modem standards of decency, including reference to
comparative material. Recognizing such evolving standards, the Court found
that the punishment of denationalization-rendering a person stateless-is "a
nationally uniform adult-based standard ... significantly alleviates any special need for First
Amendment protection"); id. at 591-602 (Kennedy, J., joined by Souter, J., Ginsburg, J.)
(advocating uniform national standard that addresses variations in community standard). Justice
Stevens dissented, finding that a community standard was inappropriate for regulating pornography
on the Internet. Id. at 602-12 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
303. See, e.g., Koh, supra note 11, at 46-48; Koh, supra note 39, at 1109-29.
304. Schabas, supra note 39, at 817.
305. 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
306. Id. at 101 (plurality opinion).
307. Id. at 100.
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condition deplored in the international community of democracies.""°  In
support of this conclusion, it noted that "[t]he civilized nations of the world
are in virtual unanimity that statelessness is not to be imposed as punishment
for crime" and that a "United Nations' survey of the nationality laws of
eighty-four nations of the world reveals that only two countries.. . impose
denationalization as a penalty for desertion.""
But following Trop there has been a long line of death penalty cases that
adopt an interpretive and structural majoritarian paradigm with only passing
references to comparativism. In Coker v. Georgia,"' a plurality looked to the
"objective evidence of the country's present judgment concerning the
acceptability of death as a penalty. 3 1  Because Georgia was the sole state in
the union that imposed capital punishment for rape, the Court concluded
that near unanimity among state legislatures "weighs very heavily on the side
of rejecting capital punishment as a suitable penalty for raping an adult
woman."3 '2 Citing Trop, the Court noted that the practices of other nations
are "not irrelevant,"3"3 although it did not clarify how they were relevant.
Enmund v. Florida314 was in accord, addressing at length the practices of state
legislatures and concluded that their legislative judgments weigh on the side
of rejecting capital punishment."' Citing Coker, the Court added that inter-
national opinion is an "additional consideration which is 'not irrelevant.'
31 6
In Thompson v. Oklahoma,"' a four-justice plurality approached the
"evolving standards of decency" test by principal reference to "legislative
enactments... [and] jury determinations" as "indicators of contemporary
standards of decency."3 ' It also noted that state legislative judgments are
consistent with the views of others who have considered the matter,
including professional organizations, as well as other nations that share our
Anglo-American heritage and leading members of the Western European
308. Id. at 102.
309. Id. at 102-03.
310. 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
311. Id. at 593.
312. Id. at 596.
313. Id. at 596 n.10. Justice Powell, concurring in part and dissenting in part, emphasized the
need to focus on "objective indicators of society's 'evolving standards of decency,' particularly
legislative enactments and the responses of juries in capital cases." Id. at 603 (Powell, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part). He made no mention to the relevance of international opinion.
314. 458 U.S. 782 (1982).
315. Id. at 793.
316. Id. at 796 n.22.
317. 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
318. Id. at 822-23 (citations omitted).
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community. '9 The remaining four Justices strongly emphasized that it was a
national consensus that was critical to an understanding of an evolving stan-
dard of decency.32 Three Justices went further and found that the consensus
in this society is "assuredly all that is relevant."32 '
The following year in Stanford v. Kentucky,322 the Court held in deter-
mining evolving standards of decency: "[Wie have looked.., to those of
modem American society as a whole.3 2 3 It emphasized:
[I]t is American conceptions of decency that are dispositive .... While
the "practices of other nations, particularly other democracies, can be
relevant to determining whether a practice uniform among our people
is not merely a historical accident, but rather so 'implicit in the con-
cept of ordered liberty' that it occupies a place not merely in our
mores, but, text permitting, in our Constitution as well," they cannot
serve to establish the... Eighth Amendment prerequisite that the
practice is accepted among our people.324
This approach is required, the Court indicated, both by the language of the
Eighth Amendment and by federalism concerns respecting the "deference we
319. Id. at 830.
320. Justice O'Connor stated that she agreed with the three Justices in dissent that the
decisions of American legislatures "provide the most reliable signs of a society-wide consensus on
this issue." Id. at 849 (O'Connor, J., concurring); see also id. at 865 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The
most reliable objective signs consist of the legislation that the society has enacted.").
321. Id. at 868 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia wrote:
The practices of other nations, particularly other democracies, can be relevant to
determining whether a practice uniform among our people is not merely a historical
accident, but rather so "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" that it occupies a
place not merely in our mores but, text permitting, in our Constitution as well. But
where there is not first a settled consensus among our own people, the views of other
nations... cannot be imposed upon Americans through the Constitution. In the present
case, therefore, the fact that a majority of foreign nations would not impose capital
punishment upon persons under 16 at the time of the crime is of no more relevance than
the fact that a majority of them would not impose capital punishment at all, or have
standards of due process quite different from our own.
Id. (citations omitted).
322. 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
323. Id. at 369. In her concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor again emphasized that
evolving standards must be measured based on a national consensus. Id. at 381 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring). Four Justices disagreed. The dissent observed that "[tihe views of organizations with
expertise in relevant fields and the choices of governments elsewhere in the world also merit our
attention as indicators whether a punishment is acceptable in a civilized society." Id. at 384(Brennan, J., dissenting). In addition, the dissent argued that "objective indicators of contemporary
standards of decency in the form of legislation in other countries is also of relevance to Eighth
Amendment analysis." Id. at 389.
324. Id. at 369 n.1 (quoting Thompson, 487 U.S. at 868-69 n.4 (Scalia, J., dissenting))
(citations omitted).
Constitutional Comparativism 691
owe to the decisions of the state legislatures under our federal system." '325 In a
separate opinion rendered the same day, the Court reiterated that position,
finding that in discerning evolving standards, what is critical is "objective
evidence of how our society views a particular punishment today." '326
Finally, in Atkins v. Virginia, the Court repeated its conclusions that the
"clearest and most reliable objective evidence of contemporary values is the
legislation enacted by the country's legislatures." '327 After a careful exami-
nation of state legislative practices, the Court concluded that the practice of
imposing the death sentence on the mentally regarded "has become truly
unusual" and that a "national consensus has developed against it."32 The
Court also noted this national consensus was consistent with a much broader
consensus shared by others who have considered the matter, including the
opinions of the "world community."2 9
Thus, the Court has indicated the Eighth Amendment is to be con-
strued with due regard for interpretive and structural majoritarian concerns.
In a nod to interpretive majoritarianism, the Court accepts the notion that
the Eighth Amendment should be read in light of evolving standards of
decency. But in recognition of structural majoritarianism, it cabins that
broad notion within a majoritarian paradigm that it dubs the national con-
sensus. This approach permits the Court to adopt an evolving
understanding of decency while remaining deferential to the decisions of
state legislatures, recognizing that specific punishments for specific crimes
remain a matter of peculiar question of state legislative policy.33 The cases
reflect a synthesis of these two strands of majoritarianism in that they
accept the use of a national consensus as a test for contemporary standards,
define that consensus based on legislative pronouncements, and caution
against finding any punishment as offending the Eighth Amendment out of
deference to state legislative prerogatives.
325. Id. at 369-70 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 176 (1976)).
326. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302,331 (1989); accord Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
327. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 312.
328. Id. at 316.
329. Id. at 316 n.21.
330. Federalism concerns have led the Court to exercise great caution in finding an Eighth
Amendment violation. See, e.g., Gregg, 428 U.S. at 176. Gregg stated:
The deference we owe to the decisions of the state legislatures under our federal system is
enhanced where the specification of punishments is concerned, for 'these are peculiarly
questions of legislative policy'.. . . A decision that a given punishment is impermissible
under the Eighth Amendment cannot be reversed short of a constitutional amendment.
The ability of the people to express their preference through the normal democratic
processes, as well as through ballot referenda, is shut off.
To the extent the Court does refer to comparative material in Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence, it is only after the majoritarian concerns have been
satisfied, and only to confirm that our standards are consistent with the natural
law themes inherent in the notions of implicit ordered liberty. In no case has
the Court relied on comparative material in the absence of a national
consensus, and in no case has the Court suggested that natural law principles
can serve as a proxy for what is cruel and unusual, divorced of majoritarian
concerns. Claims of universality are unappealing to the Justices, unless those
claims are consistent with the measured decision making of politically
accountable legislative actors. Countermajoritarian international standards
grounded in natural law theories have no location in our Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence.33
A majoritarian constitutional theory finds comparative material of little
value. Conservative versions such as structural majoritarianism emphasize
that deference is due to legislative enactments as an expression of political
democracy. Activist versions such as interpretive majoritarianism locate con-
temporary standards in community norms that find expression in our national
experience. To the extent comparative material is cited, it generally has a
subsidiary role and is borrowed from other constitutional theories such as
originalism or natural law.
IV. PRAGMATISM
Pragmatism is the leading candidate for a constitutional theory that can
credibly justify recourse to comparative material. Firm in the belief that con-
stitutional decisionmaking should employ empirical means to reach
consequentialist ends, a pragmatist may examine experiences from abroad to
shed light on possible solutions to similar problems at home. This approach
manifests itself in the admonition to avoid possible solutions that reached
adverse results elsewhere, as well as the endorsement of salutary approaches
that could be applied in our own constitutional context. The limits of prag-
matism, however, suggest that this approach is incapable of wholly sustaining
a comparativist rationale.
Pragmatism is a philosophical concept that finds all truth to be expe-
riential. As Williams James put it, "[tirue ideas are those that we can
assimilate, validate, corroborate, and verify.... The truth of an idea is not a
331. See Roger P. Alford, Misusing Intemadonal Sources to Interpret the Consftidion, 98 AM. J. INTL L
57, 59-60 (2004) ("If the national consensus is that a certain punishment is cruel and unusual, then this
American conception of decency will be dispositive. The legitimating function of this national consensus
in defining what is cruel and unusual serves as a checking function on international... norms.").
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stagnant property inherent in it. Truth happens to an idea. It becomes true, is
made true by events."' 2 In this sense, pragmatism is inherently unprincipled
and undogmatic.333 Pragmatism does not deny the existence of truth; it posits
that truth is discovered through experience. For a pragmatist, the ought is the
is. Description is prescription.
Lacking unshakable priors, a pragmatic decisionmaker is concerned
principally with factual consequences."' Such an approach looks at the law
as one "who cares only for the material consequences which such knowledge
enables him to predict, not as a good [person], who finds his reasons for con-
duct, whether inside the law or outside of it, in the vaguer sanctions of
conscience." "  Legal pragmatism takes this Jamesian conception of reality
and applies it to resolve concrete cases. When Holmes said "[the life of the
law has not been logic: it has been experience36 he was espousing a prag-
matic philosophy that resolves cases based on the "interaction of the human
organism with its environment: his beliefs, sentiments, customs, values, poli-
cies, [and] prejudices." 7 As Holmes put it, "[t]he felt necessities of the time,
the prevalent moral and political theories, intuitions of public policy, avowed
or unconscious, even the prejudices which judges share with their fellow-
men, have had a good deal more to do than the syllogism in determining the
rules by which men should be governed .... The substance of the law at any
given time pretty nearly corresponds, so far as it goes, with what is then
understood to be convenient." '338 Experience thus embraces the totality of the
cultural encounters that an objective and fair-minded judge brings to the
decisionmaking process. Not simply personal experience, but also the experi-
ence "embodie[d in] the story of a nation's development through many
332. William James, Pragmatism's Conception of Truth, in PRAGMATISM: A NEW NAME FOR
SOME OLD WAYS OF THINKING 92 (Bruce Kuklick ed., 1981) (1907).
333. See id. ("[Pragmatism] stands for no particular results. It has no dogmas, and no doctrines
save its method."); Brian Z. Tamanaha, Pragmatism in U.S. Legal Theory: Its Application to Normative
Jurisprudence, Sociolegal Studies, and the Fact-Value Distinction, 41 AM. J. JURIS. 315, 328 (1996). But
see Michael Sullivan & Daniel J. Solove, Can Pragmatism Be Radical? Richard Posner and Legal
Pragmatism, 113 YALE L.J. 687, 698-99, 734-37 (2003) (disputing the absence of what they describe
as "pragmatic valence").
334. See RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY 76, 85 (2003)
(defining pragmatic adjudication as a "disposition to ground policy judgments on facts and
consequences rather than on conceptualisms and generalities"). It is irrelevant for present purposes
to distinguish between the different categories of pragmatism, or to differentiate between pragmatism
and consequentialism. For a discussion of these topics, see id. at 35-41, 49-56, 65-71.
335. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 459 (1897).
336. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAw 1 (Little, Brown & Co. 1948) (1881).
337. LouIs MENAND, THE METAPHYSICAL CLUB 342 (2001).
338. HOLMES, supra note 336, at 1-2.
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centuries." '339 And it is from this experience-personal and corporate, contem-
porary and historical-that a judge derives his or her answers to resolve
concrete cases. Constitutional truth, for the pragmatic judge, is a juridical
understanding of our national experience.
The embodiment of the pragmatic ethic is the "reasonable man." In tort
law one is deemed blameworthy not based on some sense of one's personal
moral shortcomings, but rather based on an external standard based on a cer-
tain average of conduct.34 In contract law, the external standard of
blameworthiness is simply whether a breach is inefficient. In constitutional
law, a pragmatist would say that a law is constitutional unless a "rational and
fair man.., would admit that the statute ... would infringe fundamental
principles as... understood by the traditions of our people and our law." 341 In
other words, for Holmesian pragmatism at least, if a reasonable man might
think the law is proper, then it is constitutional. 42 Thus, pragmatism
embraces healthy experimentalism, permitting the political branches to
explore novel solutions to complex problems.
Such constitutional pragmatism embraces democratic experimentation in
deference to legislative solutions. Thus, for Richard Posner, a decision like Roe
v. Wade4 1 is problematic because, although the decision "may well have been
based on a weighing of the consequences of the alternative outcomes... the
Court ignored an important consequence-the stifling effect on democratic
experimentation of establishing a constitutional right to abortion. 3 4  Posner
339. Id. at 1.
340. Id. at 107-08.
341. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
342. See id.; Otis v. Parker, 187 U.S. 606, 608-09 (1903). In Otis, Holmes wrote:
Considerable latitude must be allowed for differences of view as well as for possible
peculiar conditions which this court can know but imperfectly, if at all. Otherwise a
constitution, instead of embodying only relatively fundamental rules of right, as generally
understood by all English-speaking communities, would become the partisan of a
particular set of ethical or economical opinions, which by no means are held semper
ubique et ab omnibus.
Id.; see also Rast v. Van Deman & Lewis Co., 240 U.S. 342, 366 (1916) (same). This reasonable
man approach is analogous to what Judge Posner calls the test of "outraging" the judge or what
substantive due process jurisprudence describes as "shocking the conscience." See POSNER, supra
note 334, at 122; see also County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 848 n.8 (1998). Lewis states:
[I]n a due process challenge to executive action, the threshold question is whether the
behavior of the governmental officer is so egregious, so outrageous, that it may fairly be
said to shock the contemporary conscience. That judgment may be informed by a history
of liberty protection, but it necessarily reflects an understanding of traditional executive
behavior, of contemporary practice, and of the standards of blame generally applied to
them.
Id.
343. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
344. POSNER, supra note 334, at 125.
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also finds deference to legislative prerogatives in times of looming national
crisis. He argues that Bush v. Gore345 represents a missed opportunity for
constitutional pragmatism. The Court could and should have resolved the
case on legislative deference, grounding its decision on the constitutional
limitations that prevent judicial usurpation of legislative authority.34 6
With the notable exception of Richard Posner, the most forceful advo-
cate for legal pragmatism is Justice Stephen Breyer. Justice Breyer's
pragmatism is skeptical of judicial control of legislative experimentation. In
dissenting to the invalidation of the line-item veto, Justice Breyer wrote that
he would have upheld the law as an innovative experiment that might
improve democratic governance. "I recognize that the Act before us is novel.
In a sense, it skirts a constitutional edge. But that edge has to do with means,
not ends. The means chosen ... represent an experiment that may, or may
not, help representative government work better. The Constitution, in my
view, authorizes Congress and the President to try novel methods in this
way." '347 Likewise, in Lopez, Justice Breyer would have deferred to the legis-
lative branch's factual findings regarding affectation of interstate commerce:
Courts must give Congress a degree of leeway in determining the exis-
tence of a significant factual connection between the regulated activity
and interstate commerce-both because the Constitution delegates
the commerce power directly to Congress and because the determi-
nation requires an empirical judgment of a kind that a legislature is
more likely than a court to make with accuracy .... Thus, the specific
question before us... is not whether the "regulated activity sufficiently
affected interstate commerce," but, rather, whether Congress could
have had "a rational basis" for so concluding.348
To put it in Holmesian terms, if a reasonable man might think the law affects
interstate commerce, then it is constitutional.349
But what is distinctive about Justice Breyer's pragmatism is its
transnational emphasis. For Breyer's pragmatism, constitutional truth depends
345. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
346. POSNER, supra note 334, at 343-47. Article II provides that "[elach State shall appoint,
in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors, equal to the whole
Number of Senators and Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the Congress." U.S.
CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2.
347. Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 496-97 (1998) (Breyer, J., dissenting); see
also Ken I. Kersch, The Synthetic Progressivism of Stephen G. Breyer, in REHNQUIST JUSTICE:
UNDERSTANDING THE COURT DYNAMIC 241, 249 (Earl M. Maltz ed., 2003).
348. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 616-17 (1995) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
349. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 660-61 (Breyer, J., dissenting)
("[W]ithin the bounds of the rational, Congress, not the courts, must remain primarily responsible for
striking the appropriate state/federal balance.").
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not just on our national experience, but also on global realities. Breyer's
pragmatism has boldly invigorated transnational empiricism as a con-
stitutional method." ' In Printz, he argued that reference to foreign experi-
ences is justified because it may "cast an empirical light on the consequences
of different solutions to a common legal problem." ' Justice Breyer reasons
that comparativism is appropriate as a mode of argument by analogy, in
which developments abroad may be capable of producing similar results in
the United States.3 2
For Breyer, the federal/state balance struck in Lopez is constitutional in
part because Congress could have recognized that "[ilncreasing global compe-
tition.., has made primary and secondary education economically more
important."3 " Noting that the United States lags behind other industrialized
nations in worker productivity, he argued that education is a commercial
problem that affects interstate and foreign commerce. 34  Lower worker
productivity in the United States is attributable in part "to students who
emerge from classrooms without the reading or mathematical skills necessary
to compete with their European or Asian counterparts.""35 In a similar vein,
in United States v. Morrison,356 Breyer relied on the European experience for
guidance in our Commerce Clause jurisprudence on the question of judicial
deference to congressional fact-finding.357
But Justice Breyer has also used transnational pragmatism to curtail what
he perceives as irrational expressions of congressional intent. As he put it in
Eldred v. Ashcroft, "[a]lthough it can be helpful to look to international norms
and legal experience in understanding American law, in this case the
[congressional] justification based upon foreign rules is surprisingly weak. 358
Comparative analysis led Justice Breyer to conclude that the Copyright Term
Extension Act was unconstitutional, in part because of its "apparent failure to
provide significant international uniformity. 3 9
Thus, Justice Breyer's pragmatism is distinctly transnational. In his
view, most people in most places share common aspirations in the face of
350. Cf. Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
351. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 977 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
352. Breyer, Keynote Address, supra note 1, at 268; Breyer Scalia Debate, supra note 1 (Justice
Breyer remarking that "If here I have a human being called a judge in a different country dealing with a
similar problem, why don't I read what he says if it's similar enough? Maybe I'll learn something.").
353. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 621 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
354. Id. at 620-21.
355. Id. at 621; see also Kersch, supra note 347, at 251.
356. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
357. Id. at 663 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
358. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 257 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
359. Id. at 264.
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common problems.' 60 Likewise, constitutional courts throughout the world
share a common enterprise, facing "the same kinds of problems... armed
with the same kinds of legal instruments. '3 6' Accordingly, it is incumbent
upon constitutional courts to learn from their shared experiences, which he
contends are more similar than different.3 62 He is convinced constitutional
comparativism will carry the day because, like any other discipline, consti-
tutional law can benefit enormously from the similar experiences of others. 63
Pragmatic comparativism is not without its difficulties. First, in
searching for commonalities among and between constitutional courts, the
Court patently risks ignoring the distinctions. For example, in Lawrence,
although the Court appealed to European jurisprudence to establish that sod-
omy laws were unconstitutional, the actual legal questions presented in each
case were radically different. In Dudgeon, the European Court of Human
Rights was addressing whether a sodomy law was "necessary... to protect
health and morals" so as to sanction interference with an expressly guar-
anteed right to privacy. 64 In Lawrence, the Court addressed whether the
practice of sodomy was subsumed within an unenumerated fundamental right
to privacy, and if not, whether a proscription against it had a rational basis.
6
Justice Breyer's finding of broad commonalities among constitutional courts is
justified only if, as one commentator has put it, "one thinks that the courts
are not really interpreting texts but deciding whether sodomy laws are justi-
fiable as a matter of moral and social policy." '
Another key problem with pragmatic comparativism is its inherently
countermajoritarian tendency. In looking abroad for solutions to common
problems, Justice Breyer risks eschewing the distinctive choices that have
been made at home. As Ken Kersch put it:
Justice Breyer, in pioneering the introduction of foreign and interna-
tional precedent and sources into his Supreme Court opinions,
represents... the jurisprudential adjunct to... elite progressive
360. Breyer, Riflexions, supra note 1.
361. Id. ("En un mot on trouve partout des juges faisant face aux m~mes esp~ces de
problmes et arm~s des mmes esp~ces d'instruments juridiques.").
362. Id.
363. Breyer, Keynote Address, supra note 1, at 266.
364. Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) paras. 48-52 (1981).
365. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562-79 (2003).
366. Michael D. Ramsey, International Materials and Domestic Rights: Reflections on Atkins and
Lawrence, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 69, 74 (2004). Justice Breyer recently remarked that comparativism is
appropriate because other constitutions, although using "different words ... come to roughly the
same thing .... [Tihe fact that this has gone on all over the world and people have come to roughly
similar conclusions.., was the reason for thinking it [comparative material] at least is the kind of
issue that maybe we ought to hear in our court .... " Breyer Scalia Debate, supra note 1.
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globalism. Through the novel use of these foreign and
international... sources into his Supreme Court opinions, he is
beginning to lay the basis for a postsovereign constitutionalism in which
the wisdom of policies, including our substantive commitments
regarding rights and liberties, is assessed by global rather than American
standards.
3 67
"Postsovereign constitutionalism" is a remarkable position to espouse for a
Supreme Court Justice, but it is not wholly unsurprising for a judicial pragma-
tist. If pragmatic adjudication evinces an unrelenting focus on real-world
consequences, it is consistent with that position to examine the common
experiences of peer nations. As Justice Breyer put it, "this Court has long
considered as relevant and informative the way in which foreign courts have
applied standards roughly comparable to our own constitutional standards in
roughly comparable circumstances .... Willingness to consider foreign judi-
cial views in comparable cases is not surprising in a Nation that from its birth
has given a 'decent respect to the opinions of mankind.
'
'
3 68
In fairness, other notable pragmatists have recognized the perils of
constitutional comparativism on precisely these grounds. Richard Posner
categorically rejects the notion the world is a single legal community, and has
expressed caution regarding the undemocratic character of citing foreign
decisions. "[D]ecisions rendered by judges in democratic countries, or by
judges from those countries who sit on international courts, are outside the
U.S. democratic orbit." '369 While our judges have a certain democratic legiti-
macy, foreign and international judges have none. Thus, Judge Posner would
embrace the notion that judges should understand the factual consequences
of real-world experiences elsewhere,37 but he would not go so far as to treat
foreign judicial decisions as authoritative in U.S. courts.37 ' "To cite foreign
law as authority is to ... suppose fantastically that the world's judges consti-
tute a single, elite community of wisdom and conscience.37
While Justice Breyer is at the vanguard of pragmatic empiricism, it is far
more difficult to find instances in which the Supreme Court has rendered
pragmatic decisions regarding constitutional liberties that rely on comparative
experiences. There are, of course, a handful of cases in which the Court has
used comparative empiricism negatively to warn against extreme responses of
367. Kersch, supra note 347, at 266.
368. Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 997 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting in denial of certiorari).
369. Richard Posner, No Thanks, We Already Have Our Own Laws, LEGAL AFF., July-Aug.
2004, at 40, 42.
370. POSNER, supra note 334, at 76.
371. Posner, supra note 369, at 42.
372. Id.
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totalitarian regimes to curtail civil liberties.7  These cases offer a parade of
horribles of state infringements on basic civil liberties. For example, in
Shaughnessy v. United States374 the Court stated: "No society is free where
government makes one person's liberty depend upon the arbitrary will of another.
Dictatorships have done this since time immemorial. They do now [in Russia,
China and Nazi Germany] .... Our Bill of Rights was written to prevent such
oppressive practices." '375 Such negative pragmatism highlights competing systems
of government that offer extreme representations of oppressive violations of civil
liberties. Uncivilized systems are presented for derision, not emulation. This is
hardly the sort of pragmatism to which Justice Breyer aspires.
A lesser variant of negative pragmatism is found when the Court exam-
ines comparative experiences only for the purpose of rejecting the foreign
approach as inappropriate. In Raines v. Byrd 376, the Court noted that "[t]here
would be nothing irrational about a system that granted standing [to legis-
latures, as] ... some European constitutional courts operate under one or
another variant of such a regime .... But it is obviously not the regime that has
obtained under our Constitution. '' ' In Washington v. Glucksberg the Court
noted evidence in the Netherlands supports the legislative concern that
opening the door to physician-assisted suicide could affect a broader license to
practice euthanasia that would be difficult to police and contain."'
"Euthanasia in the Netherlands has not been limited to competent, terminally
ill adults who are enduring physical suffering, and ... regulation of the practice
may not have prevented abuses in cases involving vulnerable persons. '379 The
Court thus utilized the Dutch experience as evidence of the potential evils that
might result from regulation as compared with prohibition, intimating that
373. See, e.g., Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 647 (1993) ("A reapportionment plan that
includes in one district individuals who belong to the same race, but who are otherwise widely
separated by geographical and political boundaries, and who may have little in common with one
another but the color of their skin, bears an uncomfortable resemblance to political apartheid.");
Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 790 (1989) ("Music is one of the oldest forms of
human expression. From Plato's discourse in the Republic to the totalitarian state in our own times,
rulers have known its capacity to appeal to the intellect and to the emotions, and have censored
musical compositions to serve the needs of the state."); Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347, 353 (1976)
("[Patronage] has been used in many European countries, and in darker times, it played a significant
role in the Nazi rise to power in Germany and other totalitarian states."); Terminiello v. City of
Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949) ("The right to speak freely and to promote diversity of ideas and
programs is therefore one of the chief distinctions that sets us apart from totalitarian regimes.").
374. 345 U.S. 206 (1953).
375. Id. at 217-18.
376. 521 U.S. 811 (1997).
377. Id. at 828.
378. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 734 (1997).
379. Id.
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the problems in the Dutch experiment supported the state's argument for a
rational basis in banning the practice.
Thus, negative pragmatism has occasionally been used to highlight aber-
rant foreign practices or advance American distinctions. With negative
pragmatism, foreign experiences are offered as object lessons of what not to do.
But positive experiences from abroad are less frequently invoked to support
pragmatic empiricism."' Perhaps the best example is Muer v. Oregon,381 a case
in which the Court relied heavily upon a brief by future Justice Louis
Brandeis-the famous Brandeis Brief-to defend state restrictions on the
working of hours of women. Brandeis surveyed national and European prac-
tices to establish empirically the negative effects of long working hours on a
woman's familial station and physical constitution. Brandeis argued "[tihe
leading countries in Europe ... have found it necessary to take action for
the protection of [women's] health and safety and the public welfare, and have
enacted laws limiting the hours of labor for adult women .... In no country in
which the legal limitation upon the hours of labor of adult women was
introduced has the law been repealed." '382 Remarkably, at the height of
Lochner,383 the Court upheld the measure. The Court found that evidence at
home and abroad established valid reasons that are "so important and so far
reaching that the need for such reduction [in the working hours of women]
need hardly be discussed.
384
Two more recent examples may be found in the cases of Miranda v.
3 385Arizona and Burson v. Freeman.386 In Miranda, the Court addressed the ques-
tion of whether the danger to law enforcement in curbs on interrogation was
overplayed. Examining the practices in four commonwealth countries,387 the
Court cited their experiences to establish that "lawlessness will not result
from warning an individual of his rights or allowing him to exercise them."
3 88
The Court took pains to note the similarity of criminal law enforcement in
380. See, e.g., Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249, 251 n.1 (1946) (comparing experiences in Canada
and Australia to support the need for judicial adjustment in the taxing authority in federal systems).
381. 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
382. Brief for the State of Oregon at 11, Muller (No. 107), available at http://library.louisville.edu/
law/brandeis/muller.html.
383. The Court distinguished Lochner by finding that the case was not "decisive of the
question before [it]" because the difference between the sexes justifies a different rule respecting a
restriction on the hours of labor. Muller, 208 U.S. at 419.
384. Id. at 420 n.1.
385. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
386. 504 U.S. 191 (1992).
387. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 486-90 (discussing practices in England, Scotland, Ceylon, and India).
388. Id. at 489.
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these jurisdictions."' Miranda thus discounted claims that particular evils would
ensue if the right to remain silent was granted based on the absence of such
evils in comparable countries. Significantly, the dissent found these countries'
experiences to be not truly comparative."' The dissent echoes a familiar
critique of transnational pragmatism; there are variables that cannot be ignored
if one wishes to capture fully the constitutional experience of other nations.3 91
In Burson, the Court addressed the constitutionality of a campaign-free
zone at polling places.3 92 In determining whether the law served a compelling
state interest, the Court examined the evolution of election reform both in
this country and abroad to demonstrate the necessity of restricted voting
areas. Voter intimidation and election fraud were common problems in
numerous countries in the nineteenth century, and by the end of that century
several countries and numerous U.S. states had adopted the so-called
"Australian system" of voting, which included the use of official ballots,
voting booths, and polling places that were off-limits to electioneering. The
Court concluded its summation of the historical experience with a decidedly
pragmatic justification for the measure under review:
[A]n examination of the history of election regulation in this country
reveals a persistent battle against two evils: voter intimidation and
election fraud. After an unsuccessful experiment with an unofficial
ballot system, all 50 States, together with numerous other Western
democracies, settled on the same solution: a secret ballot secured in
part by a restricted zone around the voting compartments. We find
that this widespread and time-tested consensus demonstrates that some
restricted zone is necessary in order to serve the States' compelling
interests in preventing voter intimidation and election fraud.393
Burson exemplifies a modest instance of reference to a uniform solution to
address a common problem. Moreover, because the solution proposed was
uniformly employed throughout the United States and other Western democ-
racies, traditional pitfalls of pragmatic comparativism were absent.394 But it is
389. Id.
390. Id. at 521-23 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (discussing counterbalancing factors in other
jurisdictions not available in the United States and concluding that these other data reflect a more
moderate conception of the rights of the accused in these countries).
391. See Tushnet, supra note 7, at 1266-67.
392. Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191 (1992).
393. Id. at 206.
394. See supra notes 364-372 and accompanying text. Advocates relied on Burson in the
recent case of McConnell v. FEC to encourage the Court to examine the comparative experiences of
other countries. See Brief of Amici Curiae International Experts at 9, McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S.
93 (2003) (No. 02-1674) ("Burson confirms Justice Breyer's observation that the experiences of other
countries may 'cast an empirical light on the consequences of different solutions to a common legal
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worth noting that Burson is not a quintessential case of pragmatic compara-
tivism. One could just as easily describe Burson as a case that reflects an his-
torical analysis of domestic adoption by state legislatures of proposals
suggested from abroad. Foreign seeds took root at home and an American
solution germinated over the course of a century.
Two aspects of the Court's limited use of empirical data from abroad to
resolve constitutional questions pragmatically are worth noting. First, the
paucity of pragmatic jurisprudence that relies on comparative experiences is
striking. For every instance in which the Court referenced global experience,
one could cite dozens of examples in which the Court resolved common
problems pragmatically without reference to comparative solutions. The
pregnant negative in the Court's jurisprudence speaks far louder than the
occasional affirmations of comparativism. To the extent the Court is a prag-
matic one, with rare exception it continues to view constitutional truth
through the lens of national experience. As David Strauss put it, as a matter
of judicial convention, it is accepted wisdom that "[t]he potential gain from
drawing on the accumulated wisdom of many societies would be outweighed by
the unmanageability of the task.""39 It should not be surprising, for example,
that the Court recently refused the invitation to consider foreign experiences
with campaign finance reform.396 Whatever pragmatic value may be brought to
bear with references to foreign experiences, those references do not compete
with the developed body of domestic law that is at hand, and they do not
resolve in any meaningful way the question of whether our First Amendment
jurisprudence sanctions the campaign finance reform measure in question.
Second, and perhaps more momentous, when comparative pragmatism is
used in constitutional jurisprudence, it often is for the benefit of the
government seeking to limit a right rather than the individual asserting the
right. Pragmatic decisionmaking, with its focus on real-world consequences,
may be used by the state to justify curtailments of a purported constitutional
right. Notably, the majority opinions in Muller, Burson, Eldred, and Glucksberg
all used comparative experiences to assert the legitimacy of the government
measure.397 If pragmatic comparativism is employed, it may be to justify a
diminishment rather than an enhancement of constitutional liberties.
problem,' and represents persuasive authority for looking to the international community in evaluating [the
statute]."). As noted above, the Court's decision was a model of majoritarianism and made no references to
comparative experiences in campaign finance reform. See supra notes 248-252 and accompanying text.
395. David A. Strauss, Common Law, Common Ground, and Jefferson's Principle, 112 YALE L.J.
1717, 1738 (2003).
396. See supra notes 246-252 and accompanying text.
397. See supra notes 164-170, 259-264,378-384, 392-394 and accompanying text.
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Governments may view constitutional comparativism as a new vehicle to
establish that a measure is necessary, or that an interest is rational or compelling.
Even where rights abroad are greater than at home, as with Glucksberg, the
experiences associated with such greater freedoms have been highlighted to warn
against the proposed alternative.39 Miranda is the notable exception. Although
the Court has suggested that comparative experiences may enhance individual
rights,3  transnational empiricism has actually been invoked to curtail individual
liberties and uphold the propriety of government action.
V. A COMPARATIVE THEORY?
Thus far constitutional comparativism has been analyzed through the lens
of traditional constitutional theories. But the notion that comparative material
is to be utilized only to the extent it facilitates one or more classic
constitutional theories no doubt will prove unsatisfying to many comparative
constitutional scholars. Those who advocate a more prominent role for com-
parative material in our constitutional system, or a more prominent role for the
American judiciary in the international system will chafe at such an ancillary
role for international and foreign law. The agenda for constitutional
comparativists is far grander, as though comparativism should have a more
searching, if not central role in constitutional adjudication. One senses the
yearning for a constitutional theory that at its core is comparative.
Part of this yearning reflects disquiet at the inadequacy of any current
theory to capture fully the aims of the comparativist agenda. Originalism and
majoritarianism offer little hope of advancing constitutional comparativism
given the central role that text and democratic preferences, respectively, play
in these theories. Pragmatism is unsatisfying because it denies the existence of
universal truths or unshakable priors and remains relentlessly focused on
consequentialist ends. It also may prove too deferential to healthy
experimentation by the political branches. Modem varieties of the natural law
tradition offer limited hope, as this theory is discredited, and to the extent it
has continued currency, it plays a subsidiary role to buttress more venerable
theories, such as majoritarianism. Moreover, in a positivist era, international
and comparative scholars are ill at ease with a constitutional theory that
embraces a bygone era of natural law internationalism.
398. See supra notes 378-380 and accompanying text.
399. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577 (2003) ("The right the petitioners seek in this case
has been accepted as an integral part of human freedom in many other countries. There has been no
showing that in this country the governmental interest in circumscribing personal choice is somehow
more legitimate or urgent.").
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From the various writings advocating the use of international and foreign
material in constitutional adjudication one may identify an emerging inchoate
comparative constitutional theory.4s This theory is both process-oriented and
substantive. The process that comparativists invoke is a transnational one that
encourages dialogue and "transjudicial debate."0 ' When comparativists deride
our judiciary for its provincialism, 42 they are contending that reference to foreign
law and practice is somehow a privileged methodology that will enhance
constitutional adjudication. Why this methodology should be preferred is far
from clear given the lex specialis that is our Constitution. But comparative
scholars offer a few suggestions.
One explanation is that a parochial methodology places the United
States at odds with international norms and creates diplomatic tensions with
foreign allies. 3  In this sense, comparativists advocate adoption on the
constitutional plane of a Charming Betsy method of construction: to the
extent a constitutional provision may admit of more than one interpretation,
one should interpret the provision consistent with international norms, and
do so out of a decent respect for the opinions of humankind.4 4 Failure to do
400. See supsra notes 7-24 and accompanying text.
401. Slaughter, supra note 13, at 198; see also Vicki C. Jackson, Transnational Discourse, Relational
Authority, and the U.S. Court: Gender Equality, 37 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 271, 271-72, 286 (2003).
402. See Ackerman, supra note 7, at 773; Koh, supra note 11, at 56-57.
403. See Koh, supra note 39, at 1123-29.
404. See Daniel Bodansky, The Use of International Sources in Constitutional Opinion, 32 GA. J.
INT'L & COMP. L 421,427 (2004) ("The policy interest in avoiding friction with the rest of the world is
reflected in the Charming Betsy doctrine, which states that, wherever possible, statutes, and presumably
the Constitution as well, should be construed so as to be consistent with international norms."); Koh,
supra note 39, at 1128-29. Koh states:
The Court should further find that allowing the practice [of executing persons with mental
retardation] to continue will strain diplomatic relations with close American allies, provide
diplomatic ammunition to countries with demonstrably worse human rights records,
increase U.S. diplomatic isolation, and impair other U.S. foreign policy interests. For that
reason, the Court should... hold that the practice of executing people with mental
retardation offends the broad universal "concepts of dignity, civilized standards, humanity
and decency" that lie at the core of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.
Id. Koh states elsewhere:
Justice Marshall ruled in The Charming Betsy that 'an act of Congress ought never to be
construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains.'
Eleven years later, he clarified that absent a contrary statute, 'the Court is bound by the
law of nations which is a part of the law of the land.' In McCulloch v. Maryland, Chief
Justice Marshall suggested that mankind's views are also relevant to the task of
constitutional interpretation ....
Koh, supra note 11, at 44-45; see also Jackson, supra note 401, at 335. Jackson states:
[R]ule-of-law values should not preclude resort to the decisions of non-U.S. tribunals as
an effort at genuine interpretation of existing U.S. legal texts, including the Constitution
... [and] may even favor interpretive rules that assume a national preference to be in
so will embroil the executive branch in political controversy, and create undo
friction as a result of discretionary judicial interpretation. Just as we presume
that the legislature would not pass a measure that would embroil us in inter-
national conflict through violations of international norms, so too should we
presume the judiciary will not seek to embroil us into such conflict through
interpretations that clash with international obligations. In other words,
there may be separation of powers reasons for interpreting constitutional
guarantees to be consistent with international values. Of course, such an
approach must remain faithful to other recognized interpretive devices,
including text, history, structure and national experience. But if these
interpretive guidelines are not conclusive, then a comparative theory may
serve as a supplementary interpretive aid in the choice of competing concep-
tions of aspirational constitutional provisions. A comparative theory would
argue "[i]nternational law can and should inform the interpretation of various
clauses of the Constitution.
' 5
A halting example of this approach is found in Boos v. Barry."°6 In Boos,
the Court was invited to limit speech near embassy properties to further the
government interest in complying with international law obligations
regarding the protection of diplomatic and consular personnel. Although the
Court rejected the claim, much of the opinion addressed the importance of
interpreting the Constitution with due regard to the government interest in
complying with international law. It noted that the "United States has a vital
national interest in complying with international law" and strongly hinted that
such an interest could be compelling."7 At a minimum, Boos suggests that
compliance with international law is an important factor to be considered in
interpreting constitutional guarantees. If international law could serve as a
compelling government interest in curtailing speech, could it also have a role
in defining it?
A second methodological reason for a comparative theory is to enhance
transnational dialogue and the global rule of law. As one noted commentator
recently put it, there are plenty of good ideas in the "global jurisprudence,"
and the impulse to look at these ideas "reflects a spirit of genuine transjudicial
conformity with international human rights law, as The Schooner Charming Betsy presumes
with respect to statutes.
Id.; see also Cleveland, supra note 7 (discussing Charming Betsy and judicial deference to political
branch acceptance or rejection of international norms).
405. Koh, supra note 39, at 1103 (quoting Har , A. Blackmun, The Supreme Court and the Law
of Nations, 104 YALE L.J. 39, 46 (1994)).
406. 485 U.S. 312 (1988).
407. Id. at 323-24.
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deliberation within a newly self-conscious transnational community."" s The
United States has long served as a role model for other constitutional courts.
Constitutional comparativism should be invoked in our constitutional
processes because it will make a "good impression" on other constitutional
courts. As the Supreme Court serves as a role model for other
constitutional courts, reciprocal reference to the decisions of other courts will
further the transjudicial dialogue.
This is what Justice O'Connor means when she says reliance on foreign
and international law "may not only enrich our own country's decisions; it
will create that all-important good impression. When U.S. courts are seen to
be cognizant of other judicial systems, our ability to act as a rule-of-law model
for other nations will be enhanced." This process seeks to enhance the
exportation of our ideals through a method that shows due respect to the ideas
of others. More broadly, it seeks to promote the global rule of law. The
movement toward constitutional convergence will converge on understandings
of human decency so as to construct a fledgling global rule of law.41°
As courts increasingly engage in a process of cross-fertilization, propo-
nents contend that respect for the rule of law as a worldwide mechanism for
ordering societies will result. Moreover, to the degree that first-tier consti-
tutional courts such as the U.S. Supreme Court reference international tribu-
nals or other constitutional courts, the stature of that law and the bodies that
promulgate it will be enhanced, as will the likelihood of compliance."' By cap-
turing and crystallizing the work of constitutional judges around the world, a
constitutional court can have disproportionate influence as it is seen as
"reflecting an emerging international consensus rather than existing as an
outlier."' 2 The result of such an approach is nothing less than a "'global legal
system" in which there are loosely composed... horizontal and vertical
408. ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 78 (2004).
409. O'Connor, SCIS Remarks, supra note 1, at 2; see also Jackson, supra note 401, at 358-
59 ("[C]onstitutions do not function solely as a charter of self-government, or an expression of
unique national identity.... Constitutions are thus adopted, and interpreted, not only with an
eye to the internal demands of the polity but also with an eye on the stature and position of the
nation state in the international arena .... ").
410. See Ruti Teitel, Comparative Constitutional Law in a Global Age, 117 HARV. L. REV.
2570, 2593-95 (2004).
411. See Breyer Scalia Debate, supra note 1 (discussing how reference by U.S. Supreme
Court to other fledgling constitutional courts will give such courts a "leg up"); Jackson, supra note
401, at 313-14 (discussing "relational authority" of constitutional courts to consider decisions on
similar human rights issues by other tribunals).
412. Slaughter, supra note 13, at 198 (quoting Frederick Shauer, The Politics and Incentives of
Legal Transplanting, in GOVERNANCE IN A GLOBALIZING WORLD 253, 258 (Joseph S. Nye & John
D. Donahue, 2000).
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networks of national and supranational judges."' 3  A comparative
constitutional theory is thus profoundly procedural in seeking a particular
comparativist methodology that promotes the global rule of law and the
establishment of a global community of courts.
But a comparative constitutional theory is also substantive in that it
maintains the existence of universal norms414 and advocates the internali-
zation of those norms as primary obligations to protect against state
infringement. Transnational legal process advocates internalization of
international norms into our constitutional jurisprudence.415 It presumes
there is a certain category of basic human rights to which the United States
should adhere notwithstanding contrary democratic preferences. And to
secure such adherence, those rights should be reflected in our constitutional
architecture. As Vicki Jackson has put it, the "new normativity of human
rights law is reflected in the way references to other constitutional courts'
decisions are often accompanied by references to international legal norms as
well. The sense of distinctive sovereignties is diminished, as is the strong
distinction between domestic constitutional law and international legal
norms. '"" The substantive theory would collapse constitutional liberties and
international human rights into a cornucopia of suprapositive norms that are
binding as a matter of constitutional law.
In some cases this substantive approach requires a broadly aspirational
reading of textual guarantees. It is occasionally asserted, for example, that if
the great majority of civilized nations prohibit juvenile death penalty, then
we should interpret the Eighth Amendment consistent with that universal
ethic."7 In other cases this approach espouses internalization of human rights
413. SLAUGHTER, supra note 408, at 100.
414. See Gerald L. Neuman, Human Rights and Constitutional Rights: Harnony and Dissonance,
55 STAN. L. REv. 1863, 1868-69 (2003) (discussing the "suprapositive" aspect of human rights that
transcends positivist commitments); Jackson, supra note 401, at 307; Teitel, supra note 410, at 2593
("Comparative Constitutionalism points us in the direction of heightened convergence in the law in
distinct areas, perhaps the most robust being transnational human rights law.").
415. Carozza, supra note 7, at 1042, 1080 (discussing transnational "constitutional space" as
dependent "on the fundamental universality of the underlying principles of law expressed through
human rights;" the universality of the common humanity of all persons "complements and supports
the transnational character of the discourse... and ... provides a justification for courts to take
foreign sources into account"); Harold Hongju Koh, Bringing International Law Home, 35 HOUS. L.
REV. 623, 643 (1998); Koh, supra note 11, at 55-56 ("Virtually all legal systems identify one or more
mechanisms through which executive, legislative, and judicial institutions may domesticate
international norms, with judicial interpretation of domestic constitutions representing only one
such channel.").
416. Jackson, supra note 401, at 309.
417. See Oral Argument, Roper v. Simmons (U.S. Oct. 13, 2004) (No. 03-633), 2004 WL
2387647, at *11-*14, *20-*21, *38; State ex rel. Simmons v. Roper, 112 S.W.3d 397, 410-11
as unenumerated constitutional rights. If the overwhelming majority of our
peer nations have eschewed sodomy laws to criminalize the private conduct of
consenting adults, then this ethic should form part of an unenumerated
constitutional right to privacy.418 Thus, in some respects, a comparative theory
is more substantive than formal, advocating judicial decisionmaking pursuant
to criteria that aim to promote transparent substantive goals.4"9 Just as certain
constitutional theories espouse a libertarian ethic42° or Rawlsian liberalism,42" ' a
comparative theory espouses a discrete substantive content: universal standards
reflected in prevailing international norms accepted by civilized nations.
The legitimacy of a comparative constitutional theory must necessarily
be subject to traditional evaluative criteria. As Richard Fallon noted, there
are widely accepted standards by which different kinds of constitutional theo-
ries can be tested and compared.422 "Almost without exception, theorists
claim that their preferred approaches optimally realize sometimes competing
values associated with (i) upholding the rule of law, (ii) promoting political
democracy, and (iii) advancing substantive justice by respecting a morally
defensible set of individual rights." 23 Examining a comparative consti-
tutional theory in light of the standards Fallon presents offers some
preliminary conclusions about its saliency as a constitutional method.
A constitutional theory that advances the rule of law promotes legal cer-
tainty, efficacy, stability, supremacy, and impartiality.424 A comparative the-
ory, like other substantive theories, likely would contend that a rule of law
"implies the intelligibility of law as a morally authoritative guide to human
conduct," and that law is "unintelligible... in the absence of rationally cog-
nizable purposes." 25 A comparative theory promotes the rule of law to the
extent it offers a morally persuasive guide to constitutionalism based on a
universal ethic. It advances the requirement of efficacy in that it "holds out
(2003), cert. granted, 124 S. Ct. 1171 (2004); Brief of Nobel Peace Prize Laureates, Roper (No. 03-633),
2004 WL 1636446; Brief of Amici Curiae Former U.S. Diplomats, Roper (No. 03-633), 2004 WL 1636448;
see also Carozza, supra note 7, at 1086-88; Koh, supra note 39, at 1129; Schabas, supra note 39, at 845-46.
418. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 572-77 (2003); Brief of Amici Curiae Mary Robinson,
Amnesty International U.S.A., Human Rights Watch, Interights, the Lawyers Committee for Human
Rights, and Minnesota Advocates for Human Rights, Lawrence (No. 02-102), 2003 WL 164151.
419. See Fallon, supra note 23, 562-63. For a discussion of the distinction between formal
and substantive theories and the problems inherent in substantive theories, see id. at 563.
420. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF
EMINENT DOMAIN (1985).
421. See DAVID A.J. RICHARDS, TOLERATION AND THE CONSTITUTION (1986).
422. Fallon, supra note 23, at 549.
423. Id. at 549-550.
424. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., "The Rule of Law" as a Concept in Constitutional Discourse, 97
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 8-9 (1997) (discussing the five elements that constitute the rule of law).
425. Id. at 21.
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the prospect of moral reasons for obedience even for those who believe there is
no general, content-independent reason to obey the law." '426 A comparative
theory also resembles other legal process theories, which satisfy the rule of law
requirement by imputing morally attractive purposes to constitutional
language.
427
But certain aspects of the rule of law element are not advanced by the
relatively novel comparative theory, including respect for precedent, history,
and tradition, the primacy of rules over substance, the importance of legal
certainty, and the certainty of decisionmaking. One prominent scholar
pointedly rejected a comparative approach out of such concerns, suggesting
that it invites judges to "troll deeply.., in the world's corpus juris" to find a
supporting citation in order to disguise a politically preferred outcome. 4"s A
constitutional theory does not advance the rule of law to the extent it licenses
a judge's preferred outcomes under false pretenses.
The second benchmark for any constitutional theory is its ability to
promote political democracy. All constitutional theories aspire to promote
political democracy, although they may differ as to what that entails.
Political democracy imputes the notion that "majorities should be able to
determine public policy without being frustrated by judicial decisions that
reflect the judges' moral values."429 Even under certain countermajoritarian
theories, judicial review of majoritarian preferences may nonetheless enhance
political democracy if it is representation-reinforcing or if it reflects a historic
understanding of a sound approximation of the balance of the rights of
majorities and minorities that is, the balance of political democracy and indi-
vidual rights.43 A comparative theory is most problematic when viewed from
the perspective of whether it advances political democracy.
Comparativism is inconsistent with political democracy in at least four
fundamental ways. First, international norms cannot serve as contemporary
reference points without being either superfluous or countermajoritarian. To
the extent that international norms reflect contemporary majoritarian prefer-
ences within the national experience, the added value of their consistency with
international norms is limited. To the extent the norms are inconsistent with
426. Id. at 37.
427. Id. at 31.
428. Posner, supra note 369, at 42; see also Breyer Scalia Debate, supra note 1 (Justice Scalia
discussing how constitutional comparativism "invites manipulation," allowing judges to cite foreign
material in order to reach a desired result, and Justice Breyer concurring that "really what's worrying
people" is, as Justice Scalia put it, the use of comparative material will be used as a reflection of the
"moral perceptions of the justices").
429. Fallon, supra note 23, at 552.
430. Id. at 553-54.
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domestic values, they cannot serve as a constitutional standard without being
countermajoritarian. Second, while all domestic judicial decisions have a
certain degree of democratic legitimacy, foreign judges have no democratic
legitimacy.43 Immune to the democratically corrective forces of judicial
election or executive nomination, there is no democratic check that the
United States can impose upon the rulemaking power of foreign courts.
Third, if a comparative theory advocates recourse to decisionmakers in an
aggregated, international judicial system, this deference will prove less sensitive
to majoritarian preferences than a judicial decisionmaker in a disaggregated,
local system.432  A comparative theory that relies on decisions of an
international judiciary is even less sensitive to local preferences than are
national judges in a federal system, much less state or local judges. In
European parlance, a comparative theory is at odds with subsidiarity, the
notion that governments should seek to locate governance at the lowest
possible level. Fourth, relative to other substantive theories, a comparative
theory is unsympathetic to political democracy. Even a countermajoritarian
substantive theory of political democracy such as Ronald Dworkin's approach
of "constitutional democracy," admits of the requirement of recourse to the
same structures of government as a majoritarian premise, including politically
accountable elected officials. " A comparative theory of constitutionalism
has yet to advance a compelling case for its consistency with political democ-
14
racy. As I have indicated elsewhere, comparativists must overcome a pro-
found international countermajoritarian difficulty.435
The third element that a comparative constitutional theory must
include is advancing substantive justice by respecting a morally defensible set
of individual rights.436 In most respects, a comparative theory offers quite
rational arguments for the validity of international norms as an appropriate
ethic for substantive justice. There is a morally defensible appeal to a theory
that seeks to bring our fundamental individuals rights into sync with
universal norms. If it is true the U.S. practice of imposing the death penalty
on juveniles or the mentally retarded is aberrant and exceptional, then there
are sound moral arguments for seeking consistency with the common agree-
ment of appropriate practices in civilized nations. Having said that, if there is
431. Martinez, supra note 24, at 461; Posner, supra note 369, at 42.
432. See Nourse, supra note 228, at 875.
433. DWORKIN, supra note 137, at 17.
434. Alford, supra note 331, at 58-61.
435. See Martinez, supra note 24, at 461 ("If the so-called counter-majoritarian difficulty is a
central dilemma in defining the judicial role in the United States, the prospect of an international
judicial system presents this difficulty multiplied by ten.").
436. See Fallon, supra note 23, at 539.
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a problem with a comparative theory in regards to individual rights it is the
choice it privileges to international norms over peculiarly American norms.
That is, while this theory does not fall short in upholding the centrality of
individual rights, it does exacerbate the debate about exactly which rights
ought to be recognized.
There are numerous examples in which the United States is an interna-
tional outlier, in some cases granting greater rights to individuals, while in
others cases granting less. A comparative theory must be able to make the
case as to why its preferred set of rights are superior to other sets of rights, and
the theory must do so consonant with political democracy and the rule of
law. Moreover, to the extent a comparative theory is more process-oriented
than substantive, it may actually result in a curtailment of individual rights.
If the force of this methodology is an unrelenting focus on a transjudicial
debate and transnational legal process, then a number of jurisprudentially
settled rights may yet again be up for grabs. As I have discussed elsewhere,
incorporation of international and comparative material into the constitutional
dialogue may require a renewed discussion on the diminishment of
constitutional rights relating to speech, abortion, establishment of religion, and
procedural due process, to name but a few.437 In each of these cases, the United
States grants individual rights that are greater than those rights enjoyed on the
international and comparative plane. This suggests that a comparative theory,
like other process-oriented theories, is presented with a conundrum: "[I]f an
important test of [a] constitutional theor[y] involves [its] capacity to define and
protect individual rights, how could it be desirable to adopt a theory with a
predominant thrust that is methodological... r438
Finally, this last criterion underscores the schizophrenic nature of
comparative theories in their current iterations. If at its bottom it is a process-
oriented approach, it will sacrifice core individual rights for the sake of
thoroughgoing comparative methodology. Given that comparative
experiences are both more and less sensitive to individual rights, "[i]f
international and foreign sources are arrows in the quiver of constitutional
interpretation, those arrows should pierce our constitutional jurisprudence
to produce results that we celebrate and that we abhor." 9 If on the other
hand, a comparative theory is at its essence a substantive ideal, it must
illuminate the selective nature of that ideal. That is, it must explain why
certain universally recognized norms are constitutionally cognizable, while
437. Alford, supra note 331, at 67-68.
438. Fallon, supra note 23, at 562.
439. Alford, supra note 331, at 69.
other foreign practices that are less solicitous to individual rights are not. If
international norms are the substantive ideal without such distinctions, then a
convincing case must be made not only for internalizing those norms to enhance
individual rights, but also for internalizing those norms to diminish certain rights
that are currently enjoyed at an enhanced level in the American ethic. This is
especially important to comparative constitutionality's appeal as a substantive
theory because consensus on normative judgments may prove difficult to
secure, particularly when it is not clear in advance how far particular
substantive ends will be pursued and what attendant costs must be accepted "in
varied and frequently unknown factual contexts.""'
CONCLUSION
Constitutional comparativism is a methodology in search of a theory.
Proponents of this approach must either explain how their approach fits within
one or more of the traditional theories, or fully detail a constitutional theory that
at its core is comparative. This Article has suggested that the use of
contemporary foreign and international laws and practices to interpret
constitutional guarantees is ill-suited under most modern constitutional theories.
Originalism will not embrace contemporary comparativism because it
does not advance the fundamental objective of interpreting constitutional
text based on the Framers' moral perceptions. Contemporary practices at
home and abroad are useless in servicing that objective. That said,
originalism has always embraced historical comparativism, particularly
experiences rooted in English practices, to secure a greater understanding of
the constitutional context. But such an approach offers little comfort for
most constitutional comparativists who are looking to a future new world
order, not a past enlightened age.
Appeals to comparative experiences are quite logical if one espouses a
natural law theory of constitutionalism. Early experience in constitutional
interpretation often relied upon natural law to limit legislative action. Mod-
em variations of this theory find in the interstices of the text rights that are
inherent but not enumerated. This tradition also finds expression in abstract,
moral readings of constitutional text to embrace natural law shibboleths such
as fairness, justice, liberty and dignity. If the Constitution simply advances
such abstractions, then appeals to foreign experiences to establish
fundamentality or universality are to be anticipated. For reasons of judicial
hegemony and substantive indeterminacy, the natural law tradition, however,
440. Fallon, supra note 23, at 565.
52 UCLA LAW REVIEW 639 (2005)712
Constitutional Comparativism 713
is discredited as a constitutional theory. Comparativists are unlikely to carry
the full weight of their comparative agenda on such a thin reed.
Majoritarianism, in its structural and interpretive varieties, is a consti-
tutional theory that is ill-suited to justify recourse to comparative material. An
approach of judicial deference to the political branches offers few opportunities
for courts to rely upon foreign experiences. Interpretive majoritarianism is a
better candidate assuming one could invoke the broadest possible conception
of community. But the longstanding tradition of the Court has been to cabin
community standards to values reflected in our own national experience.
Even if a persuasive argument could be made for a broader notion of a
community standard in certain contexts, such as regulation of obscene speech
on the Intemet, the Court has refused to expand communitarianism beyond
our borders. Euphemisms such as the "global village" or the "world
community" have yet to find meaningful constitutional expression.
As far as classic constitutional theories go, pragmatism is the leading
candidate for a theory that can sustain constitutional comparativism. Propo-
nents of this approach are at the vanguard of the comparativist movement,
and transnational empiricism will continue to grow in importance. When
resolving constitutional questions depends upon consequentialist ends, then
proposed solutions to shared problems could benefit from transnational rec-
ognition. But pragmatism is hardly capable of sustaining the full freight of
the comparativist agenda. Pragmatic decisions that enhance civil liberties are
rare, and they frequently offer a rationale for curtailing rather than advancing
constitutional rights. Moreover, the human rights movement espouses
notions of universality and fundamentality that are inconsistent with an
empirical, pragmatic theory that denies the existence of teleological truth.
Devoid of a summum bonum, pragmatism is not prescriptive to the degree that
most comparativists would like it to be.
Because all of the classic constitutional theories outlined above do not
capture a rigorous theory for constitutional comparativism, this Article outlines
what proponents might advance as an inchoate comparative constitutional
theory. Such a theory, however, struggles for legitimacy based on established
criteria, including promotion of the rule of law, protection of political
democracy, and advancement of a morally defensible set of individual rights.
Moreover, comparativists differ as to whether a comparative theory should be
process-oriented or substantive, recognizing that either approach creates unique
problems of authenticity.
Until such time as advocates can cogently offer a raison d'etre, the
search for a theory to legitimate constitutional comparativism continues.
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After all, constitutional theory is just a vehicle to make sense of a consti-
tutional practice. "Cases get decided, and behind them is a theory of
constitutional law. 44' Comparative cases are occasionally part of constitutional
practice, but those cases are senseless without theories to reveal what lies
behind them. Comparativists do themselves no favors when they advocate a
practice, but offer. no compelling theory to justify it. Without such a theory,
comparativism will remain just a fashionable constitutional accessory.
441. Lessig, supra note 23, at 1838.
